Maryland Law Review
Volume 69 | Issue 2

Policing from the Gut: Anti-Intellectualism in
American Criminal Procedure
Brian J. Foley

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
Brian J. Foley, Policing from the Gut: Anti-Intellectualism in American Criminal Procedure, 69 Md. L. Rev. 261 (2010)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Article 4

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-2\MLR202.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

18-MAR-10

13:48

POLICING FROM THE GUT: ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN
AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
BRIAN J. FOLEY*
ABSTRACT
Over the last thirty years, the Supreme Court of the United
States has given police increased power to search and seize practically
anyone they wish. In many of the Supreme Court decisions that have
helped create this sweeping power, the Court built its reasoning on
premises and rhetoric that can be described as anti-intellectual, revealing an antipathy to thinking—where, it turns out, the thinking
is about how to protect civil liberties. The Court has concluded that,
in some investigatory contexts, police need not think about a suspect’s civil liberties but instead may go ahead and search, seize, or
interrogate. Thinking about civil liberties, the Court has said, could
lead to inaction by police that could possibly result in a failure to
discover evidence or to detain a person who might be dangerous. But
when police are not required to think, courts are not required to do so
either; indeed, under the rulings in these cases, courts are barred
from ever considering claims by some people who are searched or arrested unnecessarily or even based on improper police motives. The
Court does not address this danger to civil liberties directly but disparages thinking in general, using anti-intellectual language.
This Article identifies some of these cases—including Illinois v.
Gates, which lowered the probable cause standard; Atwater v. City
of Lago Vista, which gave police discretion to arrest people who commit minor traffic offenses; and the 2008 case Virginia v. Moore,
which extended this broad arrest power to cases in which state law
prohibits arrest—and examines the Court’s reasoning and rhetoric.
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Anti-intellectualism pervades American culture, as was examined famously almost five decades ago by Richard Hofstadter in
his Pulitzer Prize-winning book Anti-intellectualism in American
Life. If anything, this antipathy toward reflection has actually increased in recent years. It is no surprise, then, that anti-intellectualism would affect our criminal procedure jurisprudence. What is
surprising is that this effect has gone largely unnoticed. This Article
will show that the reasoning in these Supreme Court opinions is inapt and tendentious, and that in the situations where the Court asserts it would be too difficult for police to think about civil liberties, it
actually is not. The tendency of the Court of not requiring police to
think about civil liberties has allowed the police to decide based on
gut feeling—which sometimes involves racial or other animus—who
ultimately will receive criminal sanctions. Indeed, in the past thirty
years, the criminal justice system has disproportionately ensnared the
poor and minorities. The cases rooted in anti-intellectualism have
undermined the rule of law and respect for citizens, and they have
promoted inaccuracy in criminal investigations by permitting police
to indulge racial and cultural animus at the expense of meaningful
investigation of crime. This Article will argue that these cases should
be reexamined and that police and courts should be required to consider civil liberties.
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Defining Anti-intellectualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Anti-intellectualism as Political Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. POLICING FROM THE GUT: SIMPLIFYING RULES AND
ERADICATING THINKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. New York v. Belton: No “ifs, ands, and buts” . . . . . . . . . .
1. The Court Adopts an Unfortunate Passage from
LaFave. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. The Problem with Bright-Line Rules . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Arizona v. Gant Reveals the Danger of the
Court’s Anti-intellectual Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Illinois v. Gates: A “Complex Superstructure of
Evidentiary and Analytical Rules” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. The Probable Cause Standard Is Weakened . . . . .
2. A Disdain for Judicial Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Further Critique of the Anti-intellectualism in
Gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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C. Davis v. United States: Police Must Honor Only Clear
Requests for Counsel by a Suspect, Though the
Suspect “Need Not Speak with the Discrimination of
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INTRODUCTION

While television and movies portray police as shrewd, even cerebral, detectives who conduct complicated investigations driven by cutting-edge science and technology, a great deal of policing in the
United States is the result of hunches and dumb luck. Sherlock
Holmes has been replaced by the muscular officer from the television
show COPS. This officer, with his military-style buzz cut, shotgun,
body armor, rubber gloves, Taser, and Glock semiautomatic pistol,
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pulls over shirtless poor people for minor offenses and, after getting
consent for a search of their cars—or after chasing and tackling
them—discovers illegal drugs. The reality is that of the more than two
million people warehoused in U.S. jails, about one quarter are there
for drug crimes.1 In many cases, these people were not arrested because of investigations; rather, they were swept off the street by a modern police force that has at its disposal a multiplicity of minor
offenses, a low standard of probable cause, and broad search and arrest powers.2 In fact, anybody driving a car is subject to arrest and at
least a limited search, either by committing a minor offense or by being accused by the police of committing a minor offense.3 Broad vagrancy laws may be unconstitutional,4 but they are not needed as an
initial matter; undesirables may nonetheless be swept off the streets.5
The restriction of broad search and seizure powers that British colonial officials exercised under general warrants animated the adoption
of the Fourth Amendment, but two centuries later American police in
1. Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, How to Construct an Underclass, or How the War on
Drugs Became a War on Education, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 61, 71–72 (2002). There has
been an explosive increase in the overall prison population and in those sentenced for
drug offenses since 1980. Id.; see also N.C. Aizenman, New High in U.S. Prison Numbers;
Growth Attributed to More Stringent Sentencing Laws, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 2008, at A1 (noting
that recent growth in the prison population due to tougher sentencing laws has resulted in
over 2.3 million incarcerated individuals in the United States, making it the country with
the largest number and percentage of residents in prison).
2. See infra Part III. See generally Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on
Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829 (2001) (discussing the
broad powers of the police to sweep citizens off the street).
3. See Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition: Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line Rules, 74 MISS. L.J. 341, 420–21 (2004) (“Current Fourth Amendment law conditions the use of the primary mode of personal
transportation in this country on liability to arbitrary arrest and search . . . . That can’t be
right.”). This Article will discuss searches incident to arrest and inventory searches of automobiles impounded by the police after arrest. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710,
1722–23 (2009) (limiting the breadth of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), by more
narrowly defining the possible justifications for searching a vehicle incident to arrest); infra
Part III.A; see also Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374–76 (1987) (concluding that police
officers’ broad discretion about which cars to impound and their subsequent ability to
conduct inventory searches of those cars according to reasonable standardized procedures
do not violate the Fourth Amendment if administered in good faith). For a discussion on
when police merely say that someone committed an offense, see ANDREW E. TASLITZ ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 239 (3d ed. 2007) (“Police lying, after all, is a phenomenon sufficiently common to have been given its own name: ‘testilying.’”).
4. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 171 (1972) (holding a
Jacksonville, Florida, ordinance prohibiting vagrancy to be unconstitutional because it
failed to provide fair notice to persons of ordinary intelligence about what conduct was
prohibited by the statute and because it encouraged “arbitrary and erratic arrests and
convictions”).
5. See Dubber, supra note 2, at 835, 908 (explaining that police now use possession
offenses to fulfill the “sweeping function” previously fulfilled by vagrancy offenses).
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many instances have wide discretion to search and seize and otherwise
investigate crime.6
In many of the United States Supreme Court decisions shifting
this power to the government, the Court has built its reasoning on
premises that can be described as anti-intellectual, revealing an antipathy to thinking—in which the thinking is about how to protect civil
liberties.7 The Court has concluded that in some situations in which
police must decide whether to search or seize or to continue interrogating, police should not have to think about civil liberties: They
should simply go ahead and search or seize or interrogate.8 If a police
officer thinks about protecting a suspect’s rights, it could lead to inaction—not arresting, not searching, not interrogating—which could result in a failure to uncover evidence or to detain a person who might
be dangerous.9 The reality, however, is that the police are thinking.
They are just doing it badly. They are relying on hunches, which may
be based on racism or other animus.10 And they are permitted to do
so: What police think, as a subjective matter, has been deemed irrelevant to the constitutionality of a search under the Fourth Amendment.11 Only the objective facts of the circumstances matter.12
The upshot of anti-intellectualism in Supreme Court cases is
watered-down objective standards, which are achieved by preferences
for “bright-line rules” and “administrability”—preferences that are relied on more prominently in the cases that allow the sweeping up of
6. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547,
556 (1999) (observing “the larger purpose for which the Framers adopted the text [of the
Fourth Amendment]; namely to curb the exercise of discretionary authority by officers,”
and explaining that “we now accord officers far more discretionary authority than the
Framers ever intended or expected”).
7. In using the term anti-intellectualism, this Article is referring to an attitude and not
about actual oppression of intellectuals. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM
IN AMERICAN LIFE 6–7 (Vintage Books 1966) (1962) (explaining difficulties with defining
the term anti-intellectualism). This attitude is revealed in the Court’s language and rhetoric. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Parts III, V.
11. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Proving racism under the Equal
Protection Clause—as Whren says is the appropriate method—is almost impossible. See
Tracey Maclin, United States v. Whren: The Fourth Amendment Problem with Pretextual Traffic
Stops, in WE DISSENT: TALKING BACK TO THE REHNQUIST COURT: EIGHT CASES THAT SUBVERTED CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS 90, 116–18 (Michael Avery ed., 2009) (discussing
the difficulty of bringing an equal protection claim for a pretextual stop under United States
v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), and McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)); see also
Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
12. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
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citizens than in other sorts of cases.13 This anti-intellectualism can be
found in opinions by a number of Justices and in cases as recent as the
Court’s 9-0 decision in Virginia v. Moore14 in 2008.
This Article will closely examine the reasoning in some of the key
cases that have helped usher in this era of policing from the gut.15 In
addition, this Article will argue that this reasoning is based on antiintellectualism, that is, the Court’s antipathy toward reflection by police officers about citizens’ rights. This approach—political rhetoric
masquerading as legal reasoning—denies the importance of rigorous
thinking by individual police officers in their work. It also denies the
role of the judiciary to protect citizens from government intrusion
and oppressive police behavior16: If police officers do not have to
think rigorously, or at all, about civil liberties in certain types of
searches and seizures, then courts do not have to consider these civil
liberties either. The result is a law enforcement machine that engages
in overly broad searches and seizures. The motivations of police officers may ultimately determine who receives criminal sanctions—
sanctions that have become harsher over the years.17 As a result, the
current system disproportionately ensnares poor individuals18 and minorities19 and leaves them without recourse. The Court’s refusal to
require police to think rigorously about whether there is actually a
need to search or seize a particular suspect also affects accuracy and
public safety by permitting police to focus on racial and cultural stereotypes at the expense of meaningful crime investigation.20 This system undermines the rule of law and the relationship between citizens
and their government. The Court’s anti-intellectual approach in
13. See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing “bright-line rules”); infra Part III.D.4 (discussing
“administrability”).
14. 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008). Justice Ginsburg penned a concurring opinion.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the
Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1282–83 (1990) (noting that the Court in United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989), agreed that the judiciary should defer to law enforcement officers’ common sense when deciding who should be arrested for suspected drug
trafficking).
17. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE (2003).
18. JEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON 109–10 (6th ed.
2001) (1979).
19. See Solomon Moore, Justice Dept. Data Show Prison Increases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007,
at A26 (explaining that recent prison population data “reflect deep racial disparities in the
nation’s correctional institutions,” with the incarceration rates of blacks in some states being more than ten times the rate for whites); Sentencing-Guideline Study Finds Continuing
Disparities, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2004, at A11 (discussing the “striking growth” in the Hispanic prison population since 1984).
20. See infra Part V.B.
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these cases is, effectively, a refusal by the Court to think about any of
these problems.21
Anti-intellectualism pervades American culture, as pointed out almost five decades ago by Richard Hofstadter, the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of Anti-intellectualism in American Life,22 and recently by
New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof.23 Given this pervasiveness,
it is no surprise that anti-intellectualism affects our criminal procedure jurisprudence. What may be surprising is that this effect appears
to have gone unnoticed: It has not been addressed in legal scholarship. This Article will show that in situations when the Court asserts
that it is too hard for police to think, it actually is not too hard, and
that more rigorous thinking by police would protect civil liberties
without leading to the dangers feared by the Court.24 The following
analysis will show that the Court, out of an excessive fear of crime,
simply has preferred to create an over-inclusive crime-control machine rather than to foster more precise and more focused policing.
The Court sees the rights in issue, such as searches incident to arrest
and arrests for minor offenses, as minor and as literally not worth the
thoughts of either the police or the Court.25 Yet such contempt for
rights is at odds with the United States Constitution. Identifying that
this contempt is rooted in anti-intellectualism—an antagonism to rigorous thinking and inquiry—and not in jurisprudence or in reasoned
deference to police tactics and expertise is an important step toward
change.
Part II will briefly explain the concept of anti-intellectualism.26
Part III will discuss the following Supreme Court cases: New York v.
21. See infra Part V for a discussion of the negative effects of the Court’s antiintellectualism.
22. HOFSTADTER, supra note 7.
23. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Obama and the War on Brains, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at
WK10 (discussing “the anti-intellectualism that has long been a strain in American life”);
see also SUSAN JACOBY, THE AGE OF AMERICAN UNREASON xi–xii (updated ed., Vintage Books
2009) (2008) (“During the past four decades, America’s endemic anti-intellectual tendencies have been grievously exacerbated . . . . This new form of anti-rationalism . . . has
propelled a surge of anti-intellectualism capable of inflicting vastly greater damage than its
historical predecessors inflicted on American culture and politics.”).
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See generally Maclin, supra note 16, at 1259–60, 1264–65, 1268–69 (discussing the
Court’s lack of concern for citizens who have experienced police infringement of their
“right to locomotion” during investigatory stops and searches based on either the reasonable suspicion standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), or something even less).
This Article will address similar concerns, but the primary focus is on cases in which antiintellectual rhetoric is prominently featured.
26. See infra Part II.
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Belton,27 Illinois v. Gates,28 Davis v. United States,29 Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista,30 Devenpeck v. Alford,31 and Virginia v. Moore.32 This Article does
not purport to have identified all of the Court’s anti-intellectual cases.
Rather, the cases discussed are exemplary and can help jurists begin
to identify this strain of rhetoric in other cases—a rhetoric that has
not been addressed until now.33 Part IV will briefly contrast these
cases with those in which the Court concluded that rigorous thinking
by police is not only possible, but also desired and required34: Tennessee v. Garner35 and Berkemer v. McCarty.36 These cases can be distinguished from the cases that promote the inhumane, unthinking
machine that sweeps up citizens who commit minor violations.37 Part
V will show the harms that flow from this anti-intellectualism.38 Part
VI will conclude that the reasoning in these cases should be
reexamined.39
II.

ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM

IN

AMERICAN LIFE

This Article uses the term “anti-intellectualism” broadly to describe antipathy toward thinking—the sort of reflection that can
27. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). After this Article was accepted for publication, the Supreme
Court further explained Belton; how to characterize the case differs according to the majority and dissenting opinions in Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). Compare id. at 1719
(stating that the Belton Court held that police may “search a vehicle incident to a recent
occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search”), with id. at 1726–27 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that, as per Belton, the police’s search of the passenger compartment is justified in every case). This treatment of Belton adds strength to this Article’s argument about
the dangers of anti-intellectualism in Supreme Court opinions. See infra Part III.A.3 for a
discussion of Gant.
28. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
29. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
30. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
31. 543 U.S. 146 (2004).
32. 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008).
33. More subtle forms of anti-intellectualism appear in other cases and will be more
easily observable by readers of this Article. For example, there is anti-intellectualism in
some of the Court’s investigative seizure cases. The same motivations—the Court’s fear of
crime and its desire to join the war on crime—animate the Court’s decision to grant police
broad discretion in that context. See infra Part III. In these cases, the anti-intellectual rhetoric is not as prominent, although there is a discussion of “common sense” rules. See
Maclin, supra note 16, at 1264. In the investigatory seizure cases, police instinct is honored:
Police officers are seen as having reasonable suspicion based on limited facts. Id. at 1278.
34. See infra Part IV.
35. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
36. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
37. See infra Part III.
38. See infra Part V.
39. See infra Part VI.
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sometimes get in the way of action, especially government action.
Anti-intellectualism is an antipathy toward pausing, pondering, and
contemplation.40 Anti-intellectualism is not opposed to what one
could call animal intelligence or shrewdness. In fact, such qualities in
the police are supposedly facilitated by the Supreme Court opinions
discussed in this Article. In politics, this anti-intellectual sentiment is
apparent in the rhetorical disdain for those who would oppose governmental policies and action that would appear to promote the common good or general welfare. The opposite of intellectualism is often
expressed as “common sense.”41
A. Defining Anti-intellectualism
Anti-intellectualism is often discussed without being precisely defined. In Anti-intellectualism in American Life,42 the best-known work
discussing this concept,43 Richard Hofstadter eschewed “a rigorous or
narrow definition”44:
[Anti-intellectualism] does not yield very readily to definition. As an idea, it is not a single proposition but a complex
of related propositions. As an attitude, it is not usually found
in a pure form but in ambivalence—a pure and unalloyed
dislike of intellect or intellectuals is uncommon. . . . The
common strain that binds together the attitudes and ideas
which I call anti-intellectual is a resentment and suspicion of
the life of the mind and of those who are considered to represent it; and a disposition constantly to minimize the value
of that life.45
Hofstadter wrote, “Dealing as I do with the milieu, the atmosphere, in which American thinking has taken place, I have had to use
40. The assumption that thought is always antithetical to action is itself an expression
of anti-intellectualism; for example, some behavior may be deemed suspicious only after
reflection.
41. See infra Part III.B.3. This type of common sense can be distinguished from what
has recently been termed “emotional common sense.” See Terry A. Maroney, Emotional
Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 851, 852 (2009) (defining common
sense as, inter alia, “sound practical judgment”). Maroney analyzes the Supreme Court’s
application of “emotional common sense” as part of its reasoning in a variety of cases,
which is “what one thinks she simply knows about emotions, based on personal experience,
socialization, and other forms of casual empiricism.” Id. at 854.
42. HOFSTADTER, supra note 7.
43. JACOBY, supra note 23, at xi–xii.
44. HOFSTADTER, supra note 7, at 7.
45. Id.; see also JACOBY, supra note 23, at 9 (“It is impossible to define anti-intellectualism
as a historical force, or a continuing American reality, in a manner as precise or useful as
the kind of definition that might be supplied for, say, abolitionism or feminism.”).
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those impressionistic devices with which one attempts to reproduce a
milieu or capture an atmosphere.”46 Hofstadter gave several examples, such as the use of “egghead,” which he described by relying on
the playful definition set forth by a writer he called “a popular novelist
of right-wing political persuasion”47:
A person of spurious intellectual pretensions . . . . Over-emotional and feminine . . . . Supercilious and surfeited with
conceit and contempt for the experiences of more sound
and able men . . . . A self-conscious prig, so given to examining all sides of a question that he becomes thoroughly addled while remaining always in the same spot. An anemic
bleeding heart.48
Hofstadter characterized the egghead as marked by “‘extreme remoteness . . . from the thought and feeling of the whole of the
people.’”49
Hofstadter also gave examples of anti-intellectualism: quotations
from President Dwight Eisenhower about intellectuals (“‘a man who
takes more words than are necessary to tell more than he knows’”)50
and about people whom we might describe today as “quick studies”;51
a Cabinet member’s comments dismissive of scientific research;52 “the
hostility to intellectuals expressed on the far-right wing [in the 1950s],
a categorical folkish dislike of the educated classes and of anything
respectable, established, pedigreed, or cultivated”;53 right-wing attacks
on universities as breeding grounds for Communism and its dangerous idealism;54 a right-wing “Jacksonian dislike of specialists and experts”;55 a Congressman’s railing against “‘isms . . . of foreign origin
46. HOFSTADTER, supra note 7, at 7.
47. Id. at 9.
48. Id. at 9–10 (quoting Louis Bromfield, The Triumph of the Egghead, FREEMAN, Dec. 1,
1952, at 155, 158).
49. Id. at 10 (quoting Bromfield, supra note 48, at 158).
50. Id. (quoting Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States, Remarks of the
President at the Breakfast in Los Angeles Given by Republican Groups of Southern California, 1954 PUB. PAPERS 875, 879 (Sept. 24, 1954)).
51. Id. at 10–11. Hofstadter did not use the term “quick study.”
52. Id. at 11–12 (quoting Study of Airpower: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Air Force of
the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 84th Cong. 1742, 1744 (1956) (statement of Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense)).
53. Id. at 12.
54. Id. at 13–14 (“‘Our universities are the training grounds for the barbarians of the
future, those who, in the guise of learning, shall come forth loaded with pitchforks of
ignorance and cynicism, and stab and destroy the remnants of human civilization.’” (quoting Jack Schwartzman, Natural Law and the Campus, FREEMAN, Dec. 3, 1951, at 149, 152)).
55. Id. at 14.
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[that] truly should have no place in American art’”;56 anti-intellectual
comments by evangelist Billy Graham (“‘[In place of the Bible] we
substituted reason, rationalism, mind culture, science worship, the
working power of government, Freudianism, naturalism, humanism,
behaviorism, positivism, materialism, and idealism. [This is the work
of] so-called intellectuals.’”);57 attacks on high school education for
being “‘highly rigid’”58 and for focusing on “‘absorption of accumulated knowledge for its own sake[, which] tend[s] to produce decadence,’”59 at the expense of “‘other goals of education, such as
preparation for citizenship, occupational competence, successful family life, self-realization in ethical, moral, aesthetic and spiritual dimensions, and the enjoyment of physical health’”;60 attacks on public
education teachers as inhumanly categorizing students according to
mathematical ability and ignoring “‘a whole life, a whole personality’”;61 and attacks on public education at teaching reading, writing,
and arithmetic to children who are unable to learn these things and
who would be better off learning other skills.62 Hofstadter summed
up these examples, which portray “the ideal assumptions of anti-intellectualism,”63 by stating the following:
Intellectuals, it may be held, are pretentious, conceited, effeminate, and snobbish; and very likely immoral, dangerous,
and subversive. The plain sense of the common man, especially if tested by success in some demanding line of practical
work, is an altogether adequate substitute for, if not actually
much superior to, formal knowledge and expertise acquired
in the schools.64
How many times in the 2008 presidential elections was Barack
Obama attacked for lacking experience in the business world, and
56. Id. at 14–15 (quoting 95 CONG. REC. 11584 (1949) (statement of Rep. Dondero)).
57. Id. at 15 (alteration in original) (quoting WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, JR., BILLY GRAHAM: REVIVALIST IN A SECULAR AGE 213 (1960)).
58. Id. at 16 (quoting CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL
POLICY ET AL., JUDGING AND IMPROVING THE SCHOOLS 8 (1960) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA
TEACHERS ASSOCIATION]).
59. Id. (quoting CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 58, at 8).
60. Id. (quoting CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 58, at 7–8).
61. Id. at 16–17 (quoting Robert E. Brownlee, A Parent Speaks Out, 17 PROGRESSIVE
EDUC. 419, 420–21 (1940)).
62. Id. at 17–18 (“‘One junior high [school] . . . has . . . accepted the fact that some
twenty percent of their students will not be up to standard in reading . . . and they are
doing other things for these boys and girls. That’s straight thinking.’” (quoting A.H.
Lauchner, How Can the Junior High School Curriculum Be Improved?, BULL. OF THE NAT’L ASS’N
OF SECONDARY-SCH. PRINCIPALS, Mar. 1951, at 296, 299–301)).
63. Id. at 18.
64. Id. at 18–19.
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how often was his experience as a community organizer and law professor said to be inadequate preparation for the presidency?65
But anti-intellectualism is not anti-intelligence. Hofstadter distinguished the two and pointed out that intelligence is always praised,
whereas intellect is not.66 The distinction is frequently made in American culture.67 Hofstadter distinguished the two concepts as follows:
[I]ntelligence is an excellence of mind that is employed
within a fairly narrow, immediate, and predictable range; it is
a manipulative, adjustive, unfailingly practical quality—one
of the most eminent and endearing of the animal virtues.
Intelligence works within the framework of limited but
clearly stated goals, and may be quick to shear away questions of thought that do not seem to help in reaching
them. . . .
. . . Whereas intelligence seeks to grasp, manipulate, reorder, adjust, intellect examines, ponders, wonders, theorizes, criticizes, imagines. Intelligence will seize the immediate meaning in a situation and evaluate it. Intellect evaluates
evaluations, and looks for the meanings of situations as a
whole.68
This is a critical distinction that this Article examines when analyzing
the cases below.
B. Anti-intellectualism as Political Cover
Many of the quotations and descriptions above seem straight out
of today’s “culture wars.” Many of these assertions are described by
Hofstadter as “right-wing,”69 and many of these assertions seem like
the shibboleths of right-wing radio and television commentary,
speeches at various “institutes” and “foundations,” and op-eds today.
Although Hofstadter did not discuss American law to any extent in his
book, these ideas animate some of the “law and order” conservative
jurisprudence of the post-Warren Court.70
65. Indeed, anti-intellectualism was on display in myriad ways during the 2008 presidential campaign. JACOBY, supra note 23, at xvi–xvii.
66. HOFSTADTER, supra note 7, at 24.
67. Id. at 25.
68. Id. at 124 n.4.
69. See, e.g., id. at 124 n.4, 134–35, 356; see also JACOBY, supra note 23, at xviii–xix (discussing the popular equation of intellectuals with liberals).
70. See DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE 124–30 (2003) (discussing the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts’ treatment of the Warren Court’s criminal procedural
decisions).
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Hofstadter also qualified his project by saying he was being careful not to overstate his case and stated, “I do not suffer from the delusion that the complexities of American history can be satisfactorily
reduced to a running battle between the eggheads and the
fatheads.”71 He explained the following:
Although I am convinced that anti-intellectualism is pervasive in our culture, I believe that it can rarely be called dominant. Again and again I have noticed, as I hope readers will,
that the more mild and benign forms of anti-intellectualism
prove to be the most widespread, whereas the most malign
forms are found mainly among small if vociferous minority
groups.72
Nor are anti-intellectuals against all ideas or all thinking—“the
leading anti-intellectuals are usually men deeply engaged with ideas,
often obsessively engaged with this or that outworn or rejected idea.
Few intellectuals are without moments of anti-intellectualism; few antiintellectuals [are] without single-minded intellectual passions.”73 Instead, “anti-intellectualism is usually the incidental consequence of
some other intention, often some justifiable intention.”74
Similarly, this Article intends to point out the anti-intellectualism
prevalent in key Supreme Court opinions addressing constitutional
criminal procedure.75 Anti-intellectualism has served a law and order
conservatism that ultimately has branded many Americans as
criminals (for minor, non-violent crimes) and decreased the civil liberties of the rest of us. It has aggrandized the power of state police.
Anti-intellectualism has served often, this Article argues, as a rhetorical device—a somewhat subliminal way of painting a concern for civil
liberties as intellectual in the sense of superfluous, subversive, dangerous, pusillanimous, and decadent. Moreover, when examined in particular cases, it is revealed as a cover for the diminution of individual
liberties, or a tendentious argument that police are unable to think in
particular situations lest they and “the people” be endangered. This
reasoning is often directly contradicted not only by the facts of the
actual case,76 but is also contradicted by other Supreme Court cases
that actually impose the requirement to think on police who are in
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
below,

HOFSTADTER, supra note 7, at 19.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
See infra Part III.
For example, the police are not in danger or in a hurry in the cases addressed
but the Court creates the rule as if the police were so pressured.
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stressful situations, such as when deciding whether to shoot a fleeing
suspect.77 This Article seeks to point out this anti-intellectualism to
blow its cover so that jurists may recognize it and realize that it often
does not end the debate in a particular case, but instead reveals that
the debate must continue and delve into topics such as racism and the
proper relationship between government and citizens.78 Jurists
should question assertions and assumptions by the Court that reflection by police (and judges) is impossible, unnecessary, or even downright bad in certain situations.
This Article will illustrate that anti-intellectualism pervades key
Supreme Court cases in the form of outright hostility toward reflective
thinking; as fear-mongering that such thinking will lead to loss of evidence and escape by dangerous criminals; as a preference for police
to be “men and women of action” rather than dithering intellectuals;
as a preference for rules that are “bright-line”79 and “administrable”80
over rules that can be described as situational and “it depends” rules
that ultimately allow for argument, deliberation, and delay by police.
Sometimes, the anti-intellectualism comes across loud and clear.
Other times, it is but a faint echo. The effect, however, is that what is
honored is not the anti-intellectual police officer, but the police officer as a common man who is full of common sense, street smarts that
cannot be articulated, and animal intelligence that is necessary to save
us from a Criminal Other who has infiltrated our society and cannot
be ferreted out by usual, intellectual means—what Justice Rehnquist
called the undetectable “perfect crime[ ]” in Illinois v. Gates,81 when,
writing for the majority, he lowered the standard of probable cause.82
To catch this subversive, embedded Criminal Other and to detect
these “perfect crimes,” the Court has conferred on police the ability to
sweep up citizens in order to rummage through their persons and
their belongings for contraband and evidence of crime—to sort out
the criminals, otherwise unidentifiable, from the populace at large.83
This broad discretion violates the norms undergirding the Fourth
77. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985) (requiring that an officer must
have probable cause to believe that a fleeing suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm
before the officer may use deadly force).
78. See infra Part V.
79. See infra Part III.A.2.
80. See infra Part III.D.4.
81. 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Id. at 237–38 (rejecting a more rigorous “two-pronged test” for determining probable cause in favor of a “totality-of-the-circumstances analysis” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
83. See infra Part III.
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Amendment.84 Anti-intellectualism has served as the “incidental consequence of some other intention, often some justifiable intention,”85
at least in the eyes of a majority of Justices in some cases; a rhetorical
tool to achieve a pro-police, pro-government result. Let us turn to
those cases now.
III. POLICING FROM
THINKING

THE

GUT: SIMPLIFYING RULES

AND

ERADICATING

The Supreme Court’s rhetoric in several cases has evinced an attitude that police need not think rigorously when carrying out their duties—that in many instances, it is just too hard and too costly (in terms
of lost evidence) for these men and women of action, as well as for
judges, to analyze police conduct.86 This Article shows that it is mostly
in low-level police search and seizure cases that this anti-intellectualism appears87—cases in which the Justices did not see the infringements by the government as particularly troubling. These cases have
green-lighted “policing from the gut”; police can follow their unarticulated instincts to ferret out the more serious offenders from
among the multitude of people stopped every day for minor offenses.
That is, a search of an automobile after arresting the driver for speeding or violating a mandatory seatbelt law may yield illegal drugs.88
This caught-dead-to-rights (or lack of rights) defendant will, when
faced with the awesome mandatory minimum sentences developed in
some jurisdictions, offer to plead guilty and give up as much information as possible about where he got the drugs, or even about other
criminality, in exchange for a bargain in sentencing. Police then may
work their way up the proverbial chain. But it is the mundane traffic
stop, combined with police instinct (or plain dumb luck), that sets this
grander investigation in motion. Removing any requirement that police consider a suspect’s rights after he has been ensnared for a minor
crime removes the requirement for a court to consider the suspect’s
rights later on, too.
This Article will not attempt to trace the development of this antiintellectualism, but instead it will show its prevalence and its influence
on the Court’s reasoning in several cases.
84. See infra Part V.
85. HOFSTADTER, supra note 7, at 22.
86. See infra Part III.A–F.
87. This Article, however, discusses Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), which is
a Miranda case.
88. Or, arguably more often, a “consent” search will yield drugs.
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New York v. Belton: No “ifs, ands, and buts”

The facts of New York v. Belton89 are a time-worn plot: Police
stopped a car for speeding.90 None of the occupants owned the car or
was related to the owner.91 Police smelled “burnt marihuana” and
also saw an envelope marked “Supergold” that the police believed was
“associated with marihuana.”92 Police ordered the men out of the car
and arrested them for drug possession.93 As part of the search, police
found Belton’s jacket in the back seat, which contained cocaine in the
pocket.94 At trial, Belton moved to suppress the cocaine, arguing that
police violated the rule from Chimel v. California,95 which allowed a
search incident to arrest of “‘the area from within which [an arrestee]
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.’”96 The
area that was permissible to search under Chimel was limited. For example, if an arrest took place in the home, police could not search
other rooms or “‘all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed
areas in that room itself.’”97 The police could search any drawers
“within an arrestee’s reach . . . because of the danger their contents
might pose to the police.”98
In reviewing the search of Belton’s jacket pocket, the Court, per
Justice Stewart, said it sought a “straightforward rule”99 and held that
“when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant
of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.”100 This
search included “the contents of any containers found within the pas89. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). A recent Supreme Court case narrowed the holding of Belton.
Compare Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1717–19 (2009) (rejecting a reading of Belton that
authorizes a vehicle to be searched incident to every arrest), with id. at 1726–27 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (arguing the majority’s narrowing of Belton’s explicit holding overruled its
“bright-line rule”).
90. Belton, 453 U.S. at 455.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 455–56.
93. Id. at 456.
94. Id.
95. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
96. Belton, 453 U.S. at 457–58 (alteration in original) (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).
97. Id. at 458 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763). But see Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325,
337 (1990) (permitting police to conduct “a properly limited protective sweep . . . when
the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts
that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest
scene”).
98. Belton, 453 U.S. at 461 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).
99. Id. at 459.
100. Id. at 460 (footnote call number omitted).
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senger compartment.”101 The Court reasoned that “if the passenger
compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will the containers in it be within his reach.”102
Although this all may sound reasonable, it should be
remembered that at the time of arrest, most occupants of cars are
outside of the car and may be in handcuffs in the back of the police
patrol car. Nevertheless, the search was ruled permissible, notwithstanding that, as Justice Brennan noted in dissent, it is “a fiction . . .
that the interior of a car is always within the immediate control of an
arrestee who has recently been in the car.”103 Indeed, it is a fiction of
comic-book superhero proportions: Can the handcuffed occupant
break out of the chains, race toward his stopped car, grab a weapon,
and use that weapon against police before the police can tackle,
Taser, or shoot him?
1. The Court Adopts an Unfortunate Passage from LaFave
The Court based its reasoning in Belton on the need for a straightforward rule and couched its reasoning in the language of anti-intellectualism. Adopting the language of an unfortunate passage from an
article by the Nation’s foremost Fourth Amendment scholar, Wayne
R. LaFave, the Court stating the following:
Yet, as one commentator has pointed out, the protection of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments “can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in
most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement.” This is because
“Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the
exclusionary rule, is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in
the context of the law enforcement activities in which they
are necessarily engaged. A highly sophisticated set of rules,
qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the
drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be
the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers
and judges eagerly feed, but they may be “literally impossible
of application by the officer in the field.”104
101.
102.
103.
104.
by-Case

Id.
Id.
Id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 458 (majority opinion) (citation omitted) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, “CaseAdjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT.
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The Court continued, quoting language from Justice Brennan in
Dunaway v. New York105: “In short, ‘[a] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests
involved in the specific circumstances they confront.’”106 Dunaway,
however, was a very different case: The Court held that the police violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when, without probable cause, they arrested and seized people in order to interrogate
them.107
Anti-intellectualism pervades the quoted passage from LaFave.
The intellectual is pitted against the police officer as a man of duty
and action. The police are described as “‘necessarily engaged’” in
“‘law enforcement activities,’” while the intellectuals—judges and lawyers—are “‘eagerly feed[ing]’” on qualifications and on “‘subtle nuances and hairline distinctions.’”108 The implication is that they are
engaged in this “heady stuff” unnecessarily, unlike the police, who are
“necessarily engaged” in their work. The anti-intellectual theme of
practical knowledge being preferable to abstract, intellectual thought
is evident.109 The police, who are protecting us, do not have time for

REV. 127, 141 [hereinafter Case-by-Case Adjudication]). The Court did not adequately consider where, later in the article, LaFave proposed some limits and qualifications to a broad
rule. See Case-by-Case Adjudication, supra, at 158–61. LaFave disagreed with the Court’s
holding in Belton as going too far. See Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright Lines” and “Good Faith,” 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 324–33
(1982) (arguing that Belton impedes the development of sound Fourth Amendment doctrine). But he wryly said that he would not ask the Court to “give back” his quoted language; instead, LaFave said he remained a proponent of bright-line rules in what he
deemed appropriate situations, such as in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
LaFave, supra, at 323, 329–30, 333 (internal quotation marks omitted). The quotation
shows up again in another anti-intellectual case: Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318,
347 (2001) (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 458). See infra Part III.D. One can fairly question
whether LaFave was being anti-intellectual or elitist. That said, his statement drew the oftseen distinction between practical men and intellectuals, and that is how the Court used
his quote. See supra Part II.A.
105. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
106. Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 213–14). Also drawing from
Dunaway, Atwater used similar language. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354 (“[T]he standard of
probable cause ‘applie[s] to all arrests, without the need to ‘balance’ the interests and
circumstances involved in particular situations.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting
Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 208)); infra Part III.D.
107. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216.
108. Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (emphasis added) (quoting Case-by-Case Adjudication, supra
note 104, at 141).
109. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 7, at 18–19 (arguing ideal assumptions of anti-intellectualism include superiority of “plain sense of the common man” to “formal knowledge”).
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such triviality.110 Moreover, as a result of this ruling, neither does the
Court. When the police are given free rein to search without complication, courts are also given free rein to disregard complaints about
such searches. After Belton, there is no way for a court to even discuss
whether an automobile search incident to arrest was constitutional
under the Fourth Amendment. All such discourse was dismissed as
trivial or as quaint. Such thinking has been erased from judicial language in a manner that calls to mind the state-created language “Newspeak” in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.111
Dissenting, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, did not
attack this premise and did not note the anti-intellectualism of the
reasoning.112 Instead, Justice Brennan argued that the Court’s
“‘bright-line’ rule”113 was arbitrary and that the Chimel rule would, in
fact, be easier for officers to apply: “The standard announced in
Chimel is not nearly as difficult to apply as the Court suggests. . . . A
rule based on that rationale should provide more guidance than the
rule announced by the Court today. Moreover, unlike the Court’s
rule, it would be faithful to the Fourth Amendment.”114
Justice Brennan spun out a number of questions that could still
arise under the rule, thus belying that the Court’s newly announced
rule had done anything to simplify police practice,115 and stated, “The
Court does not give the police any ‘bright-line’ answers to these questions. More important, because the Court’s new rule abandons the
justifications underlying Chimel, it offers no guidance to the police officer
seeking to work out these answers for himself.”116 Indeed, Justice Brennan
in Belton was envisioning a world where police actually think and work
out answers for themselves—a world where the Court and police can
serve and protect the citizen from inappropriate government intrusion. Justice Brennan conceded that “there will be some close
cases”117 under his standard, “but when in doubt the police can always
turn to the rationale underlying Chimel—the need to prevent the ar-

110. See Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 213–14 (noting that the police have limited time and
expertise to reflect on a suspect’s individual rights).
111. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).
112. Belton, 453 U.S. at 463–66 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This may be because Justice
Stewart, in a sort of jiu jitsu, used Justice Brennan’s own language from Dunaway.
113. Id. at 463.
114. Id. at 471–72.
115. Id. at 470.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 471.
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restee from reaching weapons or contraband—before exercising their
judgment.”118
2. The Problem with Bright-Line Rules
Although a thorough discussion of straightforward/bright-line
rules and the Court’s occasional preference for them under the
Fourth Amendment is beyond the scope of this Article,119 it is worth
briefly pointing out that there is a serious problem with such rules:
They guarantee that constitutional rights will be violated. Look once
more at language the Belton Court quoted from LaFave:
[T]he protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments “can only be realized if the police are acting under a
set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach
a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law
enforcement.”120
This means that in “most” instances, a person’s rights will not be
violated. But “most” does not encompass all instances. What about
those individuals who are searched when the search is wholly unreasonable—say, when the suspect is handcuffed in the back of the police
car, or when the suspect is unconscious and as a matter of medical
certainty unable to resist, or when the suspect is physically disabled
and is in a wheelchair or on a gurney? The answer is that they have no
recourse. Under a bright-line rule, the Court cannot vindicate the
rights of everybody who has been violated.121 These people are a sort
of collateral damage from the bright-line rule. The aggrieved person
cannot maintain a Section 1983 lawsuit in a federal court because it
will be rejected under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Nor,
118. Id. at 471–72.
119. For a detailed critique of bright-line rules, see, for example, Albert W. Alschuler,
Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 227–31 (1984) (arguing
that using bright-line rules to interpret the Fourth Amendment is problematic and unworkable); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Fourth Amendment: Internal Revenue Code or Body of
Principles?, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 956, 957–58 (2006) (arguing that bright-line rules make
Fourth Amendment doctrine confusing and arbitrary).
120. Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting Case-by-Case
Adjudication, supra note 104, at 142).
121. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 119, at 231 (“[C]ategorical fourth amendment rules
often lead to substantial injustice . . . .”); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits
of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2257 (1998) (“Although bright-line
rules may offer comparative advantages in reducing risks of error or bias by other decisionmakers . . . they do so only at the inevitable cost of being either overinclusive or underinclusive in serving their substantive purposes.”).

R
R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-2\MLR202.txt

unknown

2010]

FROM THE

POLICING

Seq: 21

GUT

18-MAR-10

13:48

281

if contraband or other incriminating evidence was produced, could
the person have the evidence excluded.122
Why is it that the Court eliminates the possibility of individually
considering some cases under the Fourth Amendment? The answer,
of course, is “effective law enforcement.”123 But that explanation is
cold comfort. Consider other contexts in which a similar rationale of
“effectiveness” might be posed. Why not, for example, make brightline rules under the First Amendment that might allow viewpoint discrimination against some citizens’ political speech in the name of “effective government” or even an “effective marketplace of ideas”? Why
not let some defendants’ Confrontation Clause rights be violated by
introducing against him at trial un-cross-examined, hearsay, testimonial evidence in the name of “effective criminal justice”?124 The
Fourth Amendment has achieved second-class status.125 The explanation for this occurrence is beyond the scope of this Article, but one
answer may be that the fear of crime has led to a mindset in which the
Court sees limiting the government’s ability to sweep up individuals
from the streets as a bad idea, or as too costly in terms of lost evidence
and lost arrests in the permanent War on Crime. There is language in
opinions such as Gates and Atwater to support this fear.126 To let intellectualizing stand in the way of this street sweeping—this action—is
just so much dickering and dithering of the sort that facile minds feed
on.
Last, it should be noted that the specific purpose of the broad
rule in Belton is officer safety and preservation of evidence.127 Like the
other simplified rules discussed in this Article, this rule is based on
fear. It also groups anybody arrested—for even minor crimes—as presumptively a dangerous criminal bent on harming the officer and destroying evidence. This is a broad assumption and one that seems

122. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (rejecting the contention
that “there must be litigated in each case the issue of whether or not there was present one
of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful
arrest”).
123. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 457–58 (explaining that the need to apprehend criminals and
discover evidence justifies exempting the police from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement under some circumstances).
124. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004) (strictly prohibiting introduction against a criminal defendant any un-cross-examined testimonial hearsay).
125. This second-class status has developed despite the protestations of Justice Jackson.
See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180–81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
126. See infra Part III.B, D.
127. Belton, 453 U.S. at 457–58, 461.
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destructive of the trust between government and the governed.128
The brunt of this over-inclusiveness is borne by citizens at the discretion of police.
It is unfortunate that Justice Brennan did not confront the twisting of his words from Dunaway head-on.129 In Dunaway, Justice Brennan was not simplifying a rule to allow for more police discretion, but
was holding the line on probable cause. He appears to have had in
mind the trope of the competitive cop—an intelligent, aggressive officer
who might be tempted to use a balancing test aggressively to violate a
citizen’s rights.
3. Arizona v. Gant Reveals the Danger of the Court’s Antiintellectual Rhetoric
Belton was recently limited by the Supreme Court in Arizona v.
Gant.130 What is clear is that the bright-line rule set forth in Belton has
been erased as a result of the majority’s “narrow reading” of the case,
which resulted in the following holding:
Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has been secured
and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. . . . [W]e also
conclude that circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to
believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found
in the vehicle.131
In his opinion for the majority, Justice Stevens stated that under
the broad reading of Belton, courts have allowed police to conduct
searches of arrestees’ vehicles that were wholly unnecessary for officer
128. See Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between
Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1784–88 (1994) (describing governmentcitizen trust as a central aspect of the Fourth Amendment).
129. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text.
130. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). The majority, led by Justice Stevens, appears to have challenged the accusation that it overruled Belton, but the denial is ambiguous:
[The dissent] accuses us of “overrul[ing]” Belton . . . “even though respondent
Gant has not asked us to do so.” Contrary to that claim, the narrow reading of
Belton we adopt today is precisely the result Gant has urged. That Justice Alito [in
dissent] has chosen to describe this decision as overruling our earlier cases does
not change the fact that the resulting rule of law is the one advocated by
respondent.
Id. at 1722 n.9 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted). Is Justice Stevens countering the entire claim or only the claim that Gant had not urged such a result? He appears agnostic on the claim that Gant overrules any precedents by depicting the dissent as
having “chosen to describe this decision as overruling our earlier cases.” Id.
131. Id. at 1714; see also id. at 1727 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“This ‘bright-line rule’ has now
been interred.”).

R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-2\MLR202.txt

unknown

2010]

FROM THE

POLICING

Seq: 23

GUT

18-MAR-10

13:48

283

safety and otherwise lacked probable cause, which “implicates the central concern underlying the Fourth Amendment—the concern about
giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a
person’s private effects.”132 He pointed out that such searches would
be merely a police “entitlement.”133 Justice Stevens opined that the
misreading “may be attributable to Justice Brennan’s dissent in Belton,”134 in which Justice Brennan described the holding as giving unnecessarily broad powers to police, as discussed above.135
Even if Belton had merely been misread for twenty-eight years, the
misreading probably resulted from the strong anti-intellectual rhetoric in that case instead of Justice Brennan’s characterization of the
holding.136 Police were said to not need to think at all (no “‘ifs, ands,
and buts’”137) and could search regardless of need. It is difficult to
reconcile that language with a requirement that police consider
whether a suspect can actually gain access to weapons or evidence in
the passenger compartment. The quotation the Court adopted from
LaFave reflects an antipathy to thinking. If the Belton Court did not
mean to suggest such antipathy, then the Justices should not have
agreed to adopt that quotation. One might be tempted to believe that
the Court was seduced by the colorfulness of that quotation, but instead it appears more likely that the Justices agreed with that language
and used it to further their goal of creating a bright-line rule that
would increase the police’s power to search. Justice Brennan’s dissent
made clear that the Court was giving police this broad power;138 the
Belton Court could have responded to Justice Brennan as well by stating that he mischaracterized the holding, but it did not.139 In 2004,

132. Id. at 1720 (majority opinion).
133. Id. at 1721; see also Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004) (O’Connor,
J., concurring in part) (“[L]ower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a
vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an
exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel . . . .”).
134. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 115–16.
136. In his dissent, Justice Alito disagreed with Justice Stevens’s statement and explained
that “[c]ontrary to the Court’s suggestion . . . Justice Brennan’s Belton dissent did not mischaracterize the Court’s holding in that case or cause that holding to be misinterpreted.”
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1727 (Alito, J., dissenting).
137. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (citation omitted).
138. Id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority “substantially expand[ed] the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest by permitting police officers
to search areas and containers the arrestee could not possibly reach at the time of arrest”).
139. See id. at 455–63 (majority opinion) (failing to respond to Justice Brennan’s
dissent).
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the Court also “reaffirmed” the Belton holding in Thornton v. United
States.140
The narrower reading of Belton does not, of course, solve the
problem of anti-intellectualism. It solves the problem of Belton, and it
is therefore a welcome move by the Court that will uphold Fourth
Amendment protections.141 Unfortunately, the Gant Court did not
take the opportunity to confront the anti-intellectual rhetoric that Belton relied on; indeed, the quotation from LaFave is not repeated or
even mentioned in any of the opinions in Gant. Furthermore, it is not
even clear whether any of the Justices recognized the role that this
powerful rhetoric most likely played in creating a nearly three decade
putative misreading of Belton. This Article identifies this sort of rhetoric and shows how it can shape the Court’s discourse; the fact that the
Court did not similarly do so in Gant makes the need for this identification even stronger. Indeed, as stated below, identifying this rhetoric
can help jurists identify cases that merit reexamination.
B. Illinois v. Gates: A “Complex Superstructure of Evidentiary and
Analytical Rules”
Led by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates142
weakened the probable cause standard in an opinion grounded in
anti-intellectualism.143 This move was significant: The probable cause
standard is the turnkey to the criminal justice system.144 It is the stan140. 541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004) (holding that the Belton rule applies even when a police
officer does not make contact with the arrestee until after he has left his vehicle).
141. Canny police officers know that they may still conduct a broad search of a driver
and his car if they arrest him for a minor traffic offense and then impound his car. See
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375–76 (1987) (concluding that police have broad discretion about which cars to impound and search according to standardized procedure); see
also infra Part III.D.
142. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
143. For a detailed account of how Justice Rehnquist accomplished this in Gates, see
Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257,
326–41 (1984).
144. Gates now seems like standard fare in criminal procedure casebooks, but the decision has spurred much controversy. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of
Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest
Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 379–81 (2002) (explaining
that the Gates Court “drastically relaxed” and “drastically weakened the meaning of ‘probable cause’”); Yale Kamisar, Gates, “Probable Cause,” “Good Faith,” and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REV.
551, 588–89 (1984) (discussing the lack of necessity for a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule because the Gates Court essentially adopted a “good faith” or “reasonable belief” test in “dilut[ing]” the probable cause standard (internal quotation marks omitted));
Wayne R. LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (Of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain View,
Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1186–99 (1983)
(criticizing Gates’s abandonment of the two-pronged test for determining probable cause);
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dard for searches and seizures—and often seizures lead to searches
incident to arrest—both with and without a warrant.145 Gates is also
significant because the Court reduced the strength of the probable
cause standard when it was unnecessary to do so.146 The Court
treated a test used in one aspect of the probable cause determination—determining the reliability of informants—as a proxy for the
overall probable cause standard. The Court then concluded that because this test of informant reliability was just too difficult, too timeconsuming, and too impractical, the probable cause standard itself
had to be made simpler. This simpler test enabled police and even
judges to apply the standard without fear of having a reviewing court
conclude that they had applied it incorrectly and then exclude the
evidence that the police had seized. Justice Rehnquist’s opinion has
been attacked for, among other things, misusing precedent to simplify
the informant reliability test.147 The discussion here will focus on the
anti-intellectual rhetoric and reasoning he used and will focus on
prior cases only for the anti-intellectual language Justice Rehnquist
cherry-picked from them.
In Gates, an anonymous letter was sent to the Bloomingdale, Illinois, Police Department alleging that Lance and Susan Gates were
drug dealers.148 The letter claimed that the Gateses would soon travel
to Florida to pick up a load of drugs.149 The police corroborated
Arnold H. Loewy, Protecting Citizens from Cops and Crooks: An Assessment of the Supreme Court’s
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment During the 1982 Term, 62 N.C. L. REV. 329, 345 (1984)
(noting that Gates created an “insufficiently protective” standard); Edward G. Mascolo,
Probable Cause Revisited: Some Disturbing Implications Emanating from Illinois v. Gates, 6 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 331, 331 (1983) (explaining that Gates constitutes a “wholesale assault”
on the Fourth Amendment’s vitality); Wasserstrom, supra note 143, at 326–40 (criticizing
Gates for replacing the probable cause requirement with a general reasonableness test).
For a defense of the Gates Court’s opinion, see Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common
Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 468–78, 497–501,
512–19 (1984). Grano suggested that the diminution of rights was appropriate in the interest of the wider community. Id. at 497 (suggesting a “community” model of criminal
procedure in addition to the “due process,” “crime control,” and “family” models).
145. The definition applies to all contexts where probable cause is required. See Ornelas
v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695–97 (1996) (applying the Gates test to warrantless
searches); Kamisar, supra note 144, at 584 (asserting that Gates should be limited to the
search warrant context, “[b]ut it will be a great feat” to convince the Court to adopt this
limitation).
146. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 273–74 (White, J., concurring) (declining to join the majority’s opinion rejecting the two-pronged test for probable cause); Wasserstrom, supra note
143, at 337–39 (criticizing Gates for replacing the “probable cause” standard with a weaker
“fair probability” standard).
147. Wasserstrom, supra note 143, at 329.
148. Gates, 462 U.S. at 225 (majority opinion).
149. Id.
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some of the facts in the letter and conducted surveillance on Lance
and Susan while the couple was in Florida.150 The police obtained a
search warrant to search the Gateses’ home and car when the Gateses
returned to Bloomingdale.151 The police officers who searched the
Gateses’ home found significant quantities of marijuana, weapons,
and other contraband.152 In affirming a suppression of the evidence,
the Illinois Supreme Court held that the application for the search
warrant failed to meet the probable cause standard because it did not
meet the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test establishing “veracity” (alternatively, “reliability”) and “basis of knowledge” of the informant’s
report.153
1. The Probable Cause Standard Is Weakened
In reversing the Illinois high court, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the standard for probable cause itself needed
to be refashioned to be less “rigid”: The Court substituted a general,
fluid, “totality-of-the-circumstances” test154 for the “rigid” AguilarSpinelli test applied to informant tips.155
Much of the language from Hofstadter’s book quoted earlier in
this Article is echoed in Justice Rehnquist’s opinion.156 First, Justice
Rehnquist characterized the Aguilar-Spinelli test as “rigid” and too diffi150. Id. at 225–26. There were discrepancies as to which facts police corroborated, but
they are irrelevant to this argument.
151. Id. at 226.
152. Id. at 227.
153. Id. at 216–17 (citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964)); id. at 229–30. This case was decided a year before the Supreme
Court recognized a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule. See United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923–24 (1984) (adopting a “good-faith exception for searches conducted pursuant to warrants”).
154. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236–38. Justice Rehnquist defined probable cause as the
following:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to
ensure that the magistrate had a “substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]” that
probable cause existed. We are convinced that this flexible, easily applied standard will better achieve the accommodation of public and private interests that
the Fourth Amendment requires than does the approach that has developed
from Aguilar and Spinelli.
Id. at 238–39 (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also id. at 246.
155. Id. at 230–31.
156. Justice Rehnquist echoes Hofstadter both in his own language and in the language
he used from other opinions—though none of the other opinions was nearly as antagonistic to reflection by police and judges as Gates.
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cult for police and many magistrates to apply.157 He then denounced
the standard as a “complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules.”158 Justice Rehnquist further stated the following:
[This] rigorous inquiry . . . cannot be reconciled with the
fact that many warrants are—quite properly—issued on the
basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen
applying a standard less demanding than those used in more
formal legal proceedings. Likewise, given the informal,
often hurried context in which it must be applied, the “builtin subtleties” of the “two-pronged test” are particularly unlikely to assist magistrates in determining probable cause.159
The Court also lowered the probable cause standard so that nonlawyer magistrates would be able to apply the test when deciding
whether to grant police officers’ applications for a search warrant:
We also have recognized that affidavits “are normally
drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal
investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once enacted under common law pleadings have no
proper place in this area.” Likewise, search and arrest warrants long have been issued by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and who certainly do not remain abreast of
each judicial refinement of the nature of “probable
cause.”160
Thus, according to the Court, it is acceptable for police and judges
not to know the law. The Court seems to think that this is not a problem; this solution simplifies the law so that police officers and judges
need not learn the law. Law itself seems equated with intellectualizing.
Police and judges are, according to Justice Rehnquist, in a hurry; they
are not trained. Notably, as Justice White pointed out in his concurring opinion, Shadwick v. City of Tampa,161 a case relied upon by the
majority to support its contention that persons who issue warrants
need not be trained,162 did not stand for the general proposition that
judges need not be, or often are not, legally trained.163
157. Id. at 230–31.
158. Id. at 235.
159. Id. at 235–36 (citations omitted).
160. Id. at 235 (citations omitted).
161. 407 U.S. 345, 352 (1972) (holding that a magistrate need not be a judge or lawyer).
162. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (citing Shadwick, 407 U.S. at 348–50).
163. Id. at 263 n.17 (White, J., concurring) (“I reject the Court’s insinuation that it is too
much to expect that persons who issue warrants remain abreast of judicial refinements of
probable cause.”); see also Wasserstrom, supra note 143, at 326 (“Some commentators had
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The Court’s attempt to “dumb down”164 the law was evident in
other language in the opinion that reflected anti-intellectualism and
favored men and women of action over men and women of reflection—on the (false) assumption that the two groups are always opposed. For example, Justice Rehnquist contrasted a common man
with “legal technicians”: He wrote that probable cause “‘deal[s] with
probabilities [that are] practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’”165
Here, Justice Rehnquist, like many anti-intellectuals, seems to be
fighting modernity166: It turns out that probability is technical, and
that people untrained in probabilistic reasoning often make errors in
such reasoning.167 Hofstadter explained that much of the anti-intellectualism of his time (which coincided with Justice Rehnquist’s early
professional years) was expressed in the denunciation of “experts,”
often seen as having come inappropriately to dominate public life to
the detriment of the proverbial common man.168
The Court also contrasted the “‘common-sense’” analysis carried
out by “‘practical people’”—jurors and police—with “‘library analysis
by scholars.’”169 The probable cause test should not have “requirements to be rigidly exacted”170 or be expressed in “[r]igid legal
rules,”171 which is language that echoes the uses of “rigid” that Hofstadter quoted in Anti-intellectualism in American Life.172 Instead, according to Justice Rehnquist, the “nontechnical, common-sense
suggested that the Court would not uphold search warrants or felony arrest warrants issued
by such untrained clerks.”).
164. See Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte Blanche,
77 IND. L.J. 419, 458 (2002) (using this term in describing the Court’s holding in Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)); see also infra Part III.D.
165. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 (majority opinion) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).
166. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 7, at 43 (describing the intellectual as an “ideologist
[who has] frequently hastened the country into the acceptance of change”).
167. See REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD
167–99 (2001).
168. HOFSTADTER, supra note 7, at 130–31, 151.
169. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231–32 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418
(1981)) (discussing the meaning of “particularized suspicion” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Cortez was also anti-intellectual. Chief Justice Burger upheld an officer’s reasonable suspicion that was based on training, which the Court sneeringly
contrasted with “library analysis by scholars.” Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
170. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230.
171. Id. at 232.
172. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 7, at 16 (discussing anti-intellectual praise of “‘the attempt to avoid a highly rigid system of education’” (emphasis added) (quoting CALIFORNIA
TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 58, at 8)); see also supra Part II. Justice Rehnquist used
the word “rigid” several times in his opinion for the Court. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 216–46.
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judgments of laymen applying a standard less demanding than those
used in more formal legal proceedings”173 is preferable.
Justice Rehnquist went on to cast the standard he was overthrowing as the following:
[A]n elaborate body of case law dealing with the “veracity”
prong of the Spinelli test, which in turn is broken down into
two “spurs”—the informant’s “credibility” and the “reliability” of his information, together with the “basis of knowledge” prong of the Spinelli test. That such a labyrinthine
body of judicial refinement bears any relationship to familiar
definitions of probable cause is hard to imagine.174
This casting makes the law sound overly complex and unfamiliar.
The standard is “elaborate.” There are “prongs” and “spurs.” Things
are “broken down,” which has the ring of dissection.175 There are
“refinements.” It is “labyrinthine,” mysterious. The common man
could get lost. And with his hands tied behind his back by intellectuals, the common man and the citizenry could be taken advantage of
by the Criminal Other.
2. A Disdain for Judicial Review
Justice Rehnquist stated that a reviewing court must give deference to the magistrate’s decision to grant an application for a warrant,
thus requiring substantial deference to the magistrate’s determination
of probable cause:
[T]he traditional standard of review of an issuing magistrate’s probable-cause determination has been that so long as
the magistrate had a “substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]”
that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the
Fourth Amendment requires no more. We think reaffirmation of this standard better serves the purpose of encouraging recourse to the warrant procedure and is more
consistent with our traditional deference to the probablecause determinations of magistrates than is the “two-pronged
test.”176
173. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235–36.
174. Id. at 240–41 (citation omitted).
175. Cf. William Wordsworth, The Tables Turned, in 3 THE OXFORD TREASURY OF ENGLISH
LITERATURE 240, 241 (G.E. Hadow & W.H. Hadow eds., 1908) (“Sweet is the lore which
Nature brings; / Our meddling intellect / Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things:—/
We murder to dissect.”).
176. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236–37 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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This deference seems inappropriate when the probable cause
standard is lowered to assist a magistrate who is not legally trained and
who cannot be expected to “remain abreast of each judicial refinement of the nature of ‘probable cause.’ ”177
Moreover, Justice Rehnquist expressed what seemed like disdain
for any review at all. For example, he stated that “after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the
form of de novo review” and that reviewing courts should treat a magistrate’s determination of probable cause with “great deference.”178 Referring to judicial review as “after-the-fact scrutiny”179 contains
negative connotations akin to “Monday Morning Quarterback” or
“Backseat Driver”—the critic, the intellectual. Furthermore, the
Court emphasized its point by explaining that courts should refrain
from invalidating a warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a
“ ‘hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.’ ”180
“Hypertechnical” is contrasted with “commonsense.” It is as if the
Court sought to honor the men and women of action who protect us
from the “‘horrors of drug trafficking.’”181 Is Justice Rehnquist painting his opponents on the Court, such as Justice Brennan, as pointyheaded intellectuals who side with subversive drug dealers, fussing
and finessing while the Nation is in danger?182
177. Id. at 235. As Silas Wasserstrom remarked, “If untrained court clerks who cannot
possibly ‘remain abreast’ of the nature of probable cause have constitutionally unlimited
power to issue search and arrest warrants, then a constitutionally based warrant requirement is difficult to defend.” Wasserstrom, supra note 143, at 326.
178. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236.
179. Id.
180. Id. (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965)).
181. Id. at 241 (quoting id. at 290 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
182. In 1957, Justice Rehnquist wrote an article in which he argued that the bias of law
clerks could influence the Court’s granting of certiorari—though probably not its actual
decisions in cases it heard. In this article, Justice Rehnquist’s language seems to express
concern about the “left”—described as pro-criminal, pro-Communist, and anti-business:
The bias of the clerks, in my opinion, is not a random or hit-and-miss bias.
From my observations of two sets of Court clerks during the 1951 and 1952 terms,
the political and legal prejudices of the clerks were by no means representative of
the country as a whole nor of the Court which they served.
After conceding a wide diversity of opinion among the clerks themselves, and
further conceding the difficulties and possible inaccuracies inherent in political
cataloguing of people, it is nonetheless fair to say that the political cast of the
clerks as a group was to the “left” of either the nation or the Court.
Some of the tenets of the “liberal” point of view which commanded the sympathy of a majority of the clerks I knew were: extreme solicitude for the claims of
Communists and other criminal defendants, expansion of federal power at the
expense of State power, and great sympathy toward any government regulation of
business . . . .
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3. Further Critique of the Anti-intellectualism in Gates
There are many problems with the anti-intellectual line of reasoning in Gates. Even if one were to assert that there is nothing wrong
with anti-intellectualism if it serves the justifiable end of effective law
enforcement, there was no need to dumb down the probable cause
standard in this case. For one, the Aguilar-Spinelli test, which ostensibly applied only when police and magistrates dealt with informants,
may not have been as complicated as the Gates Court believed.183 The
real problem was that lower courts had made it more complicated
than necessary.184 The Court could have taken the opportunity to
clarify or simplify the Aguilar-Spinelli test itself, which Justice White
pointed out in his concurring opinion.185 The Court could have explained that the test merely asked, when assessing a tip from an informant, about the “veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge” of the
informant’s information.186 The Court could have pointed out that,
surely, a “common man” would ask such questions of most anybody
purporting to give him important information. What questions, for
example, would the common man ask someone who, in trying to sell
him a car, says it is an “excellent car”? Wouldn’t the common man
want to find out the seller’s reputation for honesty and his knowledge
of cars in general as well as of the car for sale? Such an inquiry into
the speaker’s basis for his opinion is not “labyrinthine”;187 it is preThere is the possibility of the bias of the clerks affecting the Court’s certiorari work because of the volume factor described above. I cannot speak for any
clerk other than myself in stating as a fact that unconscious bias did creep into his
work. Looking back, I must admit that I was not guiltless on this score, and I
greatly doubt if many of my fellow clerks were much less guiltless than I. And
where such bias did have any effect, because of the political outlook of the group
of clerks that I knew, its direction would be to the political “left.”
William H. Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 13, 1957, available at http://www.usnews.com/articles/opinion/2008/12/09/williamrehnquist-writes-in-1957-on-supreme-court-law-clerks-influence.html. The article was revived in December 2008 as a sidebar to a separate article about a study concluding that
Supreme Court clerks lean to the left in the political spectrum. See Andrew Burt, Rehnquist
1957 Assertion That Clerks Influenced Supreme Court Borne Out by New Study, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Dec. 9, 2008, available at http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/
2008/12/09/rehnquist-1957-assertion-that-clerks-influenced-supreme-court-borne-out-bynew-study.html (discussing Todd C. Peppers & Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on
Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 51 (2008)).
183. But see Wasserstrom, supra note 143, at 332–33 (“I do not fault the Court for abandoning the two-pronged test. That test had, unquestionably, bred much confusion.”).
184. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 273–74 (White, J., concurring) (explaining that some lower
courts were applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test in an “unduly rigid” manner).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 230 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
187. Id. at 240.
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cisely an expression of the “common sense” that anti-intellectualism
purports to celebrate.
Justice Rehnquist sought to make the test for probable cause
more police-friendly. The reason for this is fear; indeed, fear bubbles
up from the Court’s rhetoric. Justice Rehnquist reiterated, with approval, Justice Brennan’s statement that “the Fourth Amendment may
be employed by government to cure [the horrors of drug trafficking].”188 Justice Rehnquist also warned of the dire need to lower the
standard:
[A]nonymous tips seldom could survive a rigorous application of either of the Spinelli prongs. Yet, such tips, particularly when supplemented by independent police
investigation, frequently contribute to the solution of otherwise “perfect crimes.”’ While a conscientious assessment of
the basis for crediting such tips is required by the Fourth
Amendment, a standard that leaves virtually no place for
anonymous citizen informants is not.189
According to Justice Rehnquist, there are some crimes that could
not be solved without lowering the standard.190 They are undetectable, “perfect crimes,”191 in which criminals have been able to take
advantage of laws that show them “extreme solicitude.”192 The only
way to get at these criminals, many think, is to lower the standard of
proof and other protections and to let police act on hunches or go
with their guts.193
But this fear seems overstated. For one, the Gates defendants
could have been caught had police followed the regular standard. Police could have furthered their investigation. They could have conducted surveillance on the Gateses or carried out controlled buys.
188. Id. at 241 (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 290 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
189. Id. at 237–38.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 238.
192. Rehnquist, supra note 182.
193. This is the same dynamic that arose after 9/11 and instigated the creation of a new
American justice system designed to convict terrorists by using diluted standards. See Brian
J. Foley, Guantanamo and Beyond: Dangers of Rigging the Rules, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1009, 1009–10 (2007) (explaining that the Combatant Status Review Tribunal, the vehicle
for indefinitely-imprisoned enemy combatants to challenge their status, “applies a broad
definition of ‘enemy combatant’ that inevitably ensnares innocent people; applies a presumption of guilt; has no juries; disables prisoners from gathering exculpatory evidence;
prohibits prisoners from having lawyers; and relies on hearsay, coerced confessions, and
secret evidence”). Of course, an anonymous tip could lead the police to investigate further
to test the accuracy of the tip and to develop probable cause. Kamisar, supra note 144, at
576.
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There was no need to arrest Lance and Susan Gates immediately upon
their return from Florida: The drugs in their possession did not pose
an imminent danger. Even if there are criminal enterprises where the
criminals are almost too clever to be caught, it is not impossible to
catch them. The criminal activity, especially the transfer of contraband from one person to another, can be interdicted at some point.
But even if there were such perfect crimes, the fact is that the Bill of
Rights inherently envisions a loss of evidence.194 To lower the standard because some crimes purportedly cannot be detected is incommensurate with the Constitution.
In addition, Justice Rehnquist’s reliance on language from Brinegar v. United States195 was tendentious. True, the Court in Brinegar
stated the following: “In dealing with probable cause . . . we deal with
probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly
correlative to what must be proved.”196 This language, however, was
taken out of context in Gates.197 The “technical” point to which the
Brinegar Court was referring was whether what could be deemed character evidence—evidence that in most cases would be inadmissible at
trial—could be used by police to determine probable cause.198 The
Brinegar Court indicated that it could be.199 Here, the evidence in
question was the fact that, before the search, the police knew from
personal experience that Brinegar had a reputation for being a liquor
smuggler—one of the officers had even arrested him before.200 This
fact of a prior arrest most likely would be inadmissible character evi194. See infra text accompanying notes 307–09.
195. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
196. Id. at 175.
197. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175).
This is not to say that Brinegar was correctly decided:
The facts justifying a stop of Brinegar were at best, slim. In essence, Brinegar was
seized because he had a reputation for running liquor. Justice Burton, however,
contended that the agents’ aggressive conduct was appropriate because it interrupted a criminal act, and that nothing occurred to lessen the original suspicion
of the agents. This reasoning begs the question. Justice Burton simply assumed
that it is constitutionally reasonable to seize citizens with unsavory reputations.
Maclin, supra note 16, at 1292.
198. See Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 169–70 (explaining that investigators knew that defendant
had a reputation for smuggling liquor).
199. See id. at 170 (“The evidence here is undisputed, is admissible on the issue of probable cause, and clearly establishes that the agent had good ground for believing that [defendant] was engaged . . . in illicit liquor running and dealing.”).
200. Id.
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dence at trial, as the Brinegar Court noted.201 Although character evidence can be probative and reliable, such evidence tends to be
unfairly prejudicial when offered at trial because a jury might decide
to punish a defendant for his past crimes by convicting him for the
charged crime, regardless of guilt.202 Alternatively, jurors might make
the prohibited propensity argument: Since the defendant committed
such crimes before, he probably committed the crimes in this case.203
Character evidence does not necessarily pose this same danger, however, when trained police or magistrates are weighing whether there is
probable cause to search a suspect. In contrast, the “complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules”204 in Gates was the Aguilar-Spinelli test, which was designed to help test the reliability of the
hearsay accusations from informants,205 hearsay that is being used in
determining probable cause. Hearsay is generally inadmissible at trial
because, without cross-examination, it is seen as of dubious reliability.
Thus Justice Rehnquist, in a juridical sleight of hand—or simply
as a result of sloppy thinking206—made the two tests appear
equivalent. Yes, the Gates Court and the Brinegar Court were both applying evidentiary standards, but in Brinegar, the standard was geared
toward keeping arguably reliable evidence away from jurors because
of the unfair prejudice that might result to the defendant,207 whereas
in Gates, the standard concerned determining reliability as an initial
matter.208 The language in Brinegar was arguably not even anti-intellectual because police officers are not trial lawyers—“legal technicians”209—and cannot be expected to understand stylized trial rules.
In this sense, the police are “common men.” The Aguilar-Spinelli test,
however, was not a stylized test for jury trials, but a test more akin to
201. Id. at 173. The evidence could, of course, be admitted for purposes other than
proving character. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (detailing when evidence of “other crimes,
wrongs, or acts” is admissible).
202. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948) (“[Character] is said to
weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudice one with a bad
general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.”).
203. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”);
see also United States v. Williams, 458 F.3d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting “Rule 404(b)’s
prohibition against propensity evidence”).
204. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983).
205. See supra notes 153, 174 and accompanying text.
206. For an analysis of Justice Rehnquist’s many logical errors throughout his opinions,
see Andrew Jay McClurg, Logical Fallacies and the Supreme Court: A Critical Examination of
Justice Rehnquist’s Decisions in Criminal Procedure Cases, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 741 (1988).
207. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 (1949).
208. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230–35.
209. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175.
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what “common men” would apply to any information source in their
daily lives, as shown in the previous example of the car buyer. Justice
Rehnquist conflated all “evidentiary and analytical rules,” regardless
of purpose, and deemed them all too complex for police and even for
judges.210
In Gates, there is also the sense that police are men of action, in
contrast to jurists—“library . . . scholars”211 who would second-guess
men who do their work “in the midst and haste” of an investigation.212
These men are fighting crime and protecting “the people” from “the
horrors of drug trafficking.” They are to be respected and not secondguessed or scrutinized by the clever tricks of the intellectual. But ultimately, Justice Brennan got it right in his dissent that “[w]ords such as
‘practical,’ ‘nontechnical,’ and ‘common sense,’ as used in the
Court’s opinion, are but code words for an overly permissive attitude
towards police practices in derogation of the rights secured by the
Fourth Amendment.”213 It was evident ex ante that lowering the probable cause standard could only result in more searches that are ostensibly supported by probable cause—and given the turnkey nature of
the probable cause standard, more arrests, too.
Last, the facts in Gates do not justify the Court’s antipathy toward
reflection by police. The Bloomingdale police were not really “in the
210. Even if the inquiry were complex, courts over time would be able to clarify and
categorize, creating rules, or at least rules of thumb, for police to follow. Also, police could
be trained. Police training can be quite sophisticated—and geared toward aggressively
circumventing Supreme Court rulings. For example, police have been trained to avoid the
intricacies of the requirements stemming from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See, e.g., Missouri v. Siebert, 542 U.S. 600, 605–06 (2004) (describing how the officer testifying in the case had applied a technique he had been trained to use to circumvent Miranda); see also Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1519 (2008)
(discussing police interrogation training).
211. Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
212. Id. at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)).
213. Id. at 290 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court quoted this language from the dissent in its opinion in an effort to refute it and made the ad hominem and irrelevant statement that “[a]n easy, but not a complete, answer to this rather florid statement would be
that nothing we know about Justice Rutledge suggests that he would have used the words
he chose in Brinegar in such a manner.” Id. at 241 (majority opinion). The fact is, the use
of these words in Brinegar was not “in such a manner”; in that case, as described above, the
Court was comparing the probable cause standard with rules geared toward keeping out
unfairly prejudicial albeit arguably relevant and reliable evidence from the jury. Brinegar,
338 U.S. at 173. In Gates, the Court was reducing the probable cause standard such that it
would become harder for police and magistrates to screen out unreliable evidence. Gates,
462 U.S. at 234–35; see also Kamisar, supra note 144, at 578 (“It is about as difficult to be
against ‘flexibility,’ ‘practicality,’ and ‘common sense’ as it is to be against the flag, motherhood, and apple pie . . . .”).
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midst and haste” of an investigation, at least in the sense of exigent
circumstances. They could have waited and developed their investigation properly instead of stopping the Gateses when arriving back in
Bloomingdale. Justice Rehnquist also made a telling factual error in
the Court’s opinion by referring to the month of the events as March
instead of May,214 which suggests that the Court likely did not pay
close attention to the facts section of its opinion—and, by inference,
to the facts in this case. That is because the facts did not really matter;
they were merely the best factual situation for the Court to use to
eliminate the Aguilar-Spinelli standard and lower the overall probable
cause standard.
The anti-intellectualism putatively served a justifiable intention,215 as Justice Rehnquist alluded to in the following:
Finally, the direction taken by decisions following
Spinelli poorly serves “[t]he most basic function of any government”: “to provide for the security of the individual and
of his property.” The strictures that inevitably accompany
the “two-pronged test” cannot avoid seriously impeding the
task of law enforcement. If, as the Illinois Supreme Court
apparently thought, that test must be rigorously applied in
every case, anonymous tips would be of greatly diminished
value in police work . . . . Yet, such tips, particularly when
supplemented by independent police investigation, frequently contribute to the solution of otherwise “perfect
crimes.” While a conscientious assessment of the basis for
crediting such tips is required by the Fourth Amendment, a
standard that leaves virtually no place for anonymous citizen
informants is not.216
In 1984, the year after Gates was decided, the Nation saw what was
prefigured in Gates—the introduction of the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule, which blocked suppression of evidence when
police were deemed to have seized it in good faith reliance on an
invalid search warrant.217 But after Gates, as one commentator has
noted, the good faith standard was “superfluous” because the probable cause standard and the standard of review had been so diluted.218
214. Gates, 462 U.S. at 227.
215. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 7, at 22 (explaining that “anti-intellectualism is usually
the incidental consequence of some other [often justifiable] intention”).
216. Gates, 462 U.S. at 237–38 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted).
217. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 904–05 (1984).
218. Wasserstrom, supra note 143, at 391; see also Craig M. Bradley, The “Good Faith Exception” Cases: Reasonable Exercises in Futility, 60 IND. L.J. 287, 290–91 (1985) (pointing out the
redundancy of the good faith exception after Gates); Kamisar, supra note 144, at 588–89
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Notably, the Court could have announced this good faith exception in
Gates: The Court had asked the parties to brief the issue, but then
decided that it could not decide the issue because the parties had not
raised it below.219 It was as if the Gates Court saw the chance to lower
the entire probable cause standard in warrant and non-warrant cases
and attempted to seize that opportunity.220 Of course, the good faith
exception loses some of its justification after Gates: It seems strange to
announce that evidence will not be excluded when police rely in good
faith on a defective warrant when the warrant was issued under a lenient and deferential standard.
C. Davis v. United States: Police Must Honor Only Clear Requests for
Counsel by a Suspect, Though the Suspect “Need Not Speak
with the Discrimination of an Oxford Don”
In Davis v. United States,221 the Court fashioned a pro-police rule
in the context of its Miranda jurisprudence.222 Under Miranda v. Arizona,223 police may not question an accused during custodial interrogation if the accused indicates that he “wishes to consult with an
attorney.”224 The Davis Court, per Justice O’Connor, made it clear
that it would not require police officers to think rigorously—here, in
determining whether a suspect during custodial interrogation had requested counsel.225
United States Navy investigators interrogated Davis, a sailor, because he was suspected of beating a fellow pool player to death with a
pool cue.226 Davis was advised of his Miranda rights and waived
them.227 After about ninety minutes, however, Davis said, “Maybe I
should talk to a lawyer.”228 The interrogators later said that they
asked Davis to clarify whether he was requesting counsel, and Davis
(explaining that the Court does not need to adopt a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule because Gates essentially creates that exception).
219. Gates, 462 U.S. at 217 (concluding that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the good
faith exception issue because the issue was not raised below in the Illinois courts).
220. See Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732–33 (1984) (per curiam) (emphasizing—in a warrant case—that Gates did not “merely refine or qualify the ‘two-pronged test’”
but instead changed the probable cause standard to a “totality-of-the-circumstances” test).
221. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
222. See id. at 459 (declining to “require law enforcement officers to cease questioning
immediately upon the making of an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney”).
223. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
224. Id. at 444–45.
225. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461 (“[W]e decline to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions [to determine whether a suspect is requesting counsel].”).
226. Id. at 454.
227. Id. at 454–55.
228. Id. at 455.
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said, “No, I don’t want a lawyer.”229 An hour later, Davis said, “I think
I want a lawyer before I say anything else,” and the questioning ended.230 The interrogation ended too late for Davis, who gave incriminating information that the government later used against him at
court-martial, where he was convicted of murder.231
The Supreme Court held that Davis’s first statement was not a
request for counsel because it was not clear enough.232 In coming to
this conclusion, the Court expressed the now familiar fear that allowing such statements to be taken as requests for counsel would result in a termination of the interrogation, per the Edwards rule,233 and
the loss of evidence. Justice O’Connor wrote the following:
In considering how a suspect must invoke the right to
counsel, we must consider the other side of the Miranda
equation: the need for effective law enforcement. Although
the courts ensure compliance with the Miranda requirements
through the exclusionary rule, it is police officers who must
actually decide whether or not they can question a suspect.
The Edwards rule . . . provides a bright line that can be applied by officers in the real world of investigation and interrogation without unduly hampering the gathering of
information. But if we were to require questioning to cease
if a suspect makes a statement that might be a request for an
attorney, this clarity and ease of application would be lost.
Police officers would be forced to make difficult judgment calls about
whether the suspect in fact wants a lawyer even though he has not
said so, with the threat of suppression if they guess wrong. We
therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of
the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue
questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an
attorney.234
Thus, as in Gates and Belton, police officers may charge ahead—
here, in their interrogation until they are essentially hit over the head
with a request for counsel. As if pronouncing a metaphysical truth,
the Davis Court stated that “the suspect must unambiguously request

229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 461–62.
233. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981) (holding that if a suspect invokes his right to counsel, interrogation must cease immediately).
234. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461 (second emphasis added).
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counsel,” so that “‘a statement either is such an assertion of the right
to counsel or it is not.’”235 The Court added the following:
Although a suspect need not “speak with the discrimination
of an Oxford don,” he must articulate his desire to have
counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police
officer in the circumstances would understand the statement
to be a request for an attorney. If the statement fails to meet
the requisite level of clarity, Edwards does not require that
the officers stop questioning the suspect.236
Davis thus suggests that no Oxford don is required nor desired by
the Court in the “real world of investigation and interrogation.”237
The Court set up what is essentially an impossible standard: The suspect must be clear, but not so clear as an Oxford don. Furthermore,
given the relatively low level of education obtained by many of the
individuals arrested, it is likely that the Court did not believe that any
suspect could possibly speak with such clarity. Thus, not to require
this higher level of clarity is really to lose nothing at all. Additionally,
is the Court sneering? If so, is it sneering at suspects or at Oxford
dons? Is this an instance of anti-intellectualism—of locating the
highly incongruous specter of an Oxford don in this rough and tumble world?
The Davis Court’s opinion, at first glance, appears to be based in
solid reasoning. The Edwards rule provides strict precedent: When
the suspect requests a lawyer, all interrogation must cease until he has
one.238 The Court, at least initially, appears to abide by precedent in
quoting Edwards, which said that police may not “‘reinterrogate an
accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel.’”239
The Court held, however, openly and contrary to the principles of
Miranda, that it would not accommodate the suspect who is intimidated by the overall interrogation from making a clear request for
counsel: “We recognize that requiring a clear assertion of the right to
counsel might disadvantage some suspects who—because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons—will
235. Id. at 459 (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97–98 (1984)).
236. Id. (citations omitted).
237. Id. at 461.
238. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85 (“We further hold that an accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the
accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
police.”).
239. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (emphasis added by the Court) (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at
485).

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-2\MLR202.txt

300

unknown

Seq: 40

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

18-MAR-10

13:48

[VOL. 69:261

not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want
to have a lawyer present.”240
Instead, according to Justice O’Connor’s opinion, the mere provision of the Miranda warnings itself was sufficient: “[T]he primary
protection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the
Miranda warnings themselves”241 because “‘full comprehension of the
rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel
whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process.’”242 This
is the legal fiction that accompanies the bright-line rule.
A suspect who requests counsel ambiguously likely does so because he is intimidated, as the Court itself noted.243 Thus, the suspect’s ambiguous request might be symptomatic of intimidation,
which is an indication that the suspect has not in fact comprehended
his or her rights “fully”—and thus the Miranda warnings have failed at
the outset. This line of reasoning, however, is not addressed at all by
the Davis Court. According to the Court, a full comprehension of Miranda rights apparently meant a full comprehension of the Miranda jurisprudence, even when precedent does not dictate such a requirement.
As such, a citizen must know not only that he is entitled to an attorney
if he requests one, but also that he must make his request unambiguously.
To reflect this understanding, it would appear that the Miranda warnings themselves should be amended to include this caveat. The addition of relatively little language would reflect this understanding: “Any
request for a lawyer must be made clearly and unambiguously.” It is
unlikely the Court will create such a requirement, however.244 The

240. Id. at 460; see also id. at 469–70 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (recognizing the same concern). Commenting on this language, Charles Weisselberg wrote, “In
large part, Davis undermined the Miranda Court’s assumption. The Davis majority could
not have mistaken the import of its ruling . . . .” Weisselberg, supra note 210, at 1588. The
Davis decision has invited further criticism. See, e.g., WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING
PROTECTIONS 117–18 (2001) (criticizing the Davis Court’s assumption that suspects are
aware of their rights); Sandra Guerra Thompson, Evading Miranda: How Seibert and
Patane Failed to “Save” Miranda, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 645, 663–65 (2006) (arguing that the
Davis Court should have required law enforcement officers to ask clarifying questions when
suspects are vague or ambiguous about requesting counsel).
241. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460 (majority opinion).
242. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986)).
243. Id.
244. The Court seems comfortable letting citizens bear the responsibility of knowing
and asserting their rights without any help from police. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Good
and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 27, 65–67,
76–78 (2008) (discussing the prominence of Justice Kennedy’s view that citizens must
know their rights and affirmatively assert them in the context of refusal of consent under
the Fourth Amendment).
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result of Davis is that the police’s objective of gathering evidence is
preferred over civil liberties.
Against this background, the Court’s somewhat antagonistic approach to judgment calls made by police officers seems inappropriate.
The Court considered the rule that when a suspect makes “an ambiguous or equivocal statement,”245 police must then ask clarifying questions; however, the Court did not adopt this rule.246 In fact, the
government’s position was that it had complied with such a requirement.247 Davis had disagreed with the Court’s adoption of such a rule
and had argued that it would give too much discretion to investigators
to keep interrogating in the name of obtaining clarification, including
to the point of intimidating the suspect to say he was not asking for
counsel.248
Davis had also argued that prohibiting interrogators from asking
clarifying questions would create a bright-line rule, thus demonstrating that bright-line rules do not necessarily benefit either party.249
Davis’s proposed rule was that if a statement “made by a suspect during custodial interrogation could reasonably be understood, in context, as a request for counsel,” then it was such a request.250 An
ambiguous request could, after all, be a request. Davis was probably
correct, as his overall exchange with investigators showed that, notwithstanding the investigators’ clarifying question, Davis was intimidated and requested counsel.251 When Davis said he was not
requesting counsel in response to the clarifying question, he likely
said so because he felt intimidated.
Instead, the Davis Court’s holding does not require police to
think or to weigh whether a request has been made. According to
Davis, if the police have to guess, the suspect has not made a clear
enough request; therefore, there was no request because a statement

245. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461.
246. Id. at 461–62.
247. Brief of Respondent, Davis, 512 U.S. 452 (No. 92-1949), 1994 WL 381973. The
government argued that it had acted properly by asking clarifying questions, as opposed to
ending the interrogation. Id. at 15–20. For support, the government argued that Edwards
could be read as requiring police to seek clarification when a suspect makes an ambiguous
request for counsel. Id.
248. See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 7–10, Davis, 512 U.S. 452 (No. 92-1949), 1994 WL
192041.
249. Brief of Petitioner at 30–36, Davis, 512 U.S. 452 (No. 92-1949), 1993 WL 723479.
250. Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 248, at 1.
251. See id. at 8 (explaining that the act of asking clarifying questions “will either have a
coercive effect, or be likely to be perceived as such by a suspect”).
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is either a request for counsel, or it is not.252 As such, after Davis,
police officers hold a decisive advantage—no thinking is required of
them. One wonders how a suspect might feel if he asks ambiguously
for counsel—because he is intimidated—and police ignore that request and continue interrogating him. The Court appeared to acknowledge the suspect’s plight, however, by stating that “it will often
be good police practice for the interviewing officers to clarify whether
or not he actually wants an attorney.”253 In practice, the rule actually
prevents such good practice because there is little incentive for police
to ask for clarification.
Finally, although the standard calls for a “reasonable officer,”254
this is a misnomer. A reasonable officer would reason, comprehend
the power disparity, and understand that some suspects, “because of
fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons
. . . will not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present.”255 The reasonable officer—especially one having respect for a suspect’s rights—would ask for
clarification, which, according to the Court, is good police practice.
The police officer is allowed to prevail over an intimidated citizen,
who, because of fear or lack of education, “fails to meet the requisite
level of clarity.”256 The Court effectively lowered the standard of reasonableness to one in which the police may be practically insensate to
the suspect’s concerns, thus putting the burden on the citizen to take
control of a situation that the police very much have power over.257

252. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (“‘[A] statement either is such an assertion of the right to
counsel or it is not.’” (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97–98 (1984))).
253. Id. at 461.
254. Id. at 459.
255. Id. at 460.
256. Id. at 459.
257. The Court has made similar requirements of citizen-suspects in other cases. See,
e.g., Maclin, supra note 16, at 1303 (stating that the police practice of stopping and questioning a person is “unrealistic and unfair” because most people will not feel comfortable
denying the police officer’s request and because the Court’s approach adopts the police
officer’s perspective as opposed to the citizen’s as to whether there is a constitutional violation); Maclin, supra note 244, at 65–82 (arguing that after United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S.
194 (2002), “if [citizens] do not want to be searched [by police], it is their responsibility to
know and assert their rights and tell the police to leave them alone”). The intimidation
factor, of course, is likely to be lower in the street than in a custodial interrogation at a
police station—this distinction animated Miranda. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
444 (1966) (requiring procedural safeguards only in the context of “custodial
interrogation”).
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D. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista: “We Cannot Expect Every Police
Officer to Know the Details of Frequently Complex Penalty
Schemes”
In 1997, Gail Atwater was driving with her minor children in Lago
Vista, Texas.258 She was pulled over by police officer Bart Turek after
he observed that neither Atwater nor her children were wearing their
seatbelts while riding in the front seat of the pickup truck.259 Though
the offense was punishable by only a fine, state law authorized arrest
for the offense.260 Officer Turek decided to arrest her and did so in
an abusive manner: According to the Court, Turek subjected Ms.
Atwater to “merely gratuitous humiliations . . . [and was] (at best)
exercising extremely poor judgment.”261 Officer Turek did not cite
any need to arrest Atwater at the time.262 Ms. Atwater and her husband filed a lawsuit under Section 1983 for violation of her Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure.263
The Court rejected Ms. Atwater’s arguments that the arrest was
unconstitutional.264 First, it rejected her historical argument that at
common law, warrantless arrests for misdemeanors were permitted
only when a breach of the peace was committed in the officer’s presence or was “about to be committed or renewed in his presence.”265
1. “No Compelling Need” for Arrest Is No Reason Not to Arrest
Moving past historical inquiry as inconclusive,266 the Court secondly considered Atwater’s argument for what is known as “reasonableness balancing,”267 in which Atwater argued “for a modern arrest
rule, one not necessarily requiring violent breach of the peace, but
nonetheless forbidding custodial arrest, even upon probable cause,
when conviction could not ultimately carry any jail time and when the
government shows no compelling need for immediate detention.”268
The compelling need could be shown in cases in which the person
258. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001).
259. Id. at 323–24.
260. Id. at 323.
261. Id. at 346–47.
262. Id. at 369–70 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 325 (majority opinion).
264. Id. at 323 (holding that an officer’s warrantless arrest of a citizen for a minor criminal offense did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
265. Id. at 328 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Davies, supra
note 144 (criticizing the Atwater Court’s treatment of plaintiff’s historical argument).
266. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 345.
267. Id. at 346.
268. Id.
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who committed the crime posed a danger to others, a danger to continue the criminal activity, or was wanted on an outstanding arrest
warrant.269
The Court began by acknowledging the logic of Atwater’s
argument:
If we were to derive a rule exclusively to address the uncontested facts of this case, Atwater might well prevail. She
was a known and established resident of Lago Vista with no
place to hide and no incentive to flee, and common sense
says she would almost certainly have buckled up as a condition of driving off with a citation. . . . Atwater’s claim to live
free of pointless indignity and confinement clearly outweighs
anything the City can raise against it specific to her case.270
As Justice O’Connor noted in dissent, “In my view, the Fourth
Amendment inquiry ends there.”271 Instead, Justice Souter, who was
writing for the majority, used anti-intellectualist reasoning and departed on a rhetorical tour de force (indeed, bordering on farce) that
made it appear that to require the police to think would endanger us
all:
[W]e have traditionally recognized that a responsible
Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by standards
requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field be
converted into an occasion for constitutional review. Often
enough, the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the
spur (and in the heat) of the moment, and the object in implementing its command of reasonableness is to draw standards sufficiently clear and simple to be applied with a fair
prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing months and
years after an arrest or search is made. Courts attempting to
strike a reasonable Fourth Amendment balance thus credit
the government’s side with an essential interest in readily administrable rules.272
There is the sense, as in Gates, that judicial review is somehow
inappropriate and even unfair—standards should be applied with “a
fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing months and years
269. See id. at 346–47.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 371 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 347 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). The Court added that Fourth
Amendment rules should not be “‘qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts.’” Id. (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)).
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after an arrest or search is made.”273 It is as if the judges will have
months and years to develop ways to “second-guess” (a pejorative
term) law enforcement, to scrutinize and criticize a police officer who
had to act quickly. It is as if the typical judge is opposed to the police.
2. Complications Arise
The Court continued in the following vein: “[C]omplications
arise the moment we begin to think about the possible applications of
the several criteria Atwater proposes for drawing a line between minor
crimes with limited arrest authority and others not so restricted.”274
For example, the Court rejected the line between “‘jailable’ and ‘fineonly’ offenses”275 because more complications arose: The police may
not be able to distinguish between the two penalties.276
These “complications”277 are not, however, all that complicated:
The Court actually overcomplicated the situation, as a cursory look
will show. For example, why can’t we expect officers to know the law—
especially the difference between jailable and non-jailable offenses
that police encounter on a daily basis? Are all laws “frequently complex penalty schemes”?278 Perhaps they “frequently” are, but that is
no reason to treat the exception as the norm. The Court did not support this assertion with any empirical evidence of penalty schemes that
are too complex for police to manage (this would be the relevant inquiry, rather than an inquiry into the merely complex).279 Justice
Souter simply supplied a citation to Berkemer v. McCarty,280 which itself
was devoid of empirical evidence (and which also emphatically left
police with a rule that required them to think in a situational, “it depends,” manner).281 As a normative matter, don’t we want police to
know the law?282 There are echoes of Justice Rehnquist’s claims in
273. Id.
274. Id. at 348.
275. Id.
276. Id. (“It is not merely that we cannot expect every police officer to know the details
of frequently complex penalty schemes . . . but that penalties for ostensibly identical conduct can vary on account of facts difficult (if not impossible) to know at the scene of the
arrest.”).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. (considering details of “complex penalty schemes”).
280. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
281. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 348; see also Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 430–31 (discussing possible
“guesses” a police officer might have to make); infra Part IV.B.
282. Wayne Logan wrote, “Atwater suggests that police cannot, and should not be expected to, know the law, a tenet contrary to both decisional law and common sense.” Logan, supra note 164, at 457.
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Gates that some laws are just too complex for police and even judges
to administer.283 The problems with police not knowing the law are
many, but one that arises here is that the arrest can ultimately lead to
a “street trial”: Once the suspect is arrested, he may be searched incident to that arrest—and further searching might include his entire
vehicle if he gives “consent” or if police decide to impound the car.284
If contraband is found, the suspect becomes a defendant, and in a
possession case, there is really no defense.285 Arrest and trial, in effect, are carried out by someone who is not required to know the
law—the police officer. Moreover, the procedures are carried out
under a rule fashioned precisely because the officer, in the Court’s
view, cannot be expected to know the law. Lurking deep beneath the
surface is a lawlessness and a sense of a denial of due process.286
3. Jailable Versus Fine-Only Offenses
The Court also conflated sentencing issues with arrest issues in
claiming that an officer should not have to be able to distinguish between jailable and fine-only crimes.287 At first blush, this seems reasonable—but only from the point of view of the police and not of a
citizen who might be completely surprised by this exercise of government power.288 By radioing headquarters, however, the officer can
283. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235–36 (1983) (suggesting that complex evidentiary
and analytical rules are difficult for police to apply in “informal, often hurried
context[s]”).
284. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375–76 (1987) (concluding that police
have broad discretion about which cars to impound and may conduct an inventory search
of the car according to standardized procedure).
285. See Dubber, supra note 2, at 856–58 (explaining that the increasingly expansive
interpretation of possession statues has made possession “far less vulnerable to legal
challenges”).
286. See infra Part V (discussing how anti-intellectual attitudes prevent judges, police,
and lawyers from considering whether constitutional rights are violated). Logan suggests
that ultimately the sort of government harm in Atwater could rise to a due process violation.
See Logan, supra note 164, at 464.
287. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 348 (2001).
288. This may raise a due process issue of notice or a Fourth Amendment issue of reasonable expectation of privacy. See Logan, supra note 164, at 464 (due process); Shawn M.
Mamasis, Note, Fear of the Common Traffic Stop—“Am I Going to Jail?” The Right of the Police to
Arbitrarily Arrest or Issue Citations for Minor Misdemeanors in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 27
T. MARSHALL L. REV. 85, 96–97 (2001) (reasonable expectation of privacy). Regarding
point of view, Kit Kinports notes the following about the Court with respect to Fourth
Amendment and confessions cases:
[T]he Court shifts opportunistically from case to case between subjective and objective tests, and between whose point of view—the police officer’s or the defendant’s—it views as controlling. Moreover, these deviations cannot be explained
either by the principles the Court claims underlie the various constitutional provisions at issue or by the attributes of subjective and objective tests themselves.
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fairly reliably find out whether the citizen has a police record or is
wanted on an outstanding warrant.289 Presumably all officers do that
after stopping a motorist, and such a fact could be weighed in the
officer’s determination of whether to make an arrest. Instead, the
Atwater Court effectively treated all citizens as having prior records or
outstanding bench warrants; it turned the exception into the norm. It
made it so that the officer need not bother checking whether such is
the case if he or she does not want to, which could lead to a danger of
under-inclusiveness and false negatives—police not arresting people
who should be arrested. As to whether the marijuana is “a gram above
or a gram below the fine-only line,”290 perhaps the police—whose cars
are crammed with radios, firearms, first-aid kits, flashlights, handcuffs,
and the like—should simply add a scale to this mix in order to weigh
any drugs they seize since there is a “fine-only” line, created by state or
federal law, that should be honored.291
The Court continued spinning its supposedly complex web by
noting that Atwater’s proposed rule contained additional “refinements”292 and that Atwater proposed that her limitation of drawing
the line at non-jailable traffic offenses be “qualified by a proviso authorizing warrantless arrests where necessary for enforcement of the
traffic laws or when [an] offense would otherwise continue and pose a
danger to others on the road.”293 But what were Atwater’s “refinements” up to now? That the police know and follow the law? That the
police not treat every citizen as a career criminal? Now Atwater has
proposed a “limitation,” one that is even “qualified by a proviso,”
which sounds enormously complicated. But perhaps just calling this
all a “suggestion” would be more accurate and sound less
complicated.

Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 71, 71 (2008).
289. Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 359 (2002).
290. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 348–49.
291. Justice Souter would likely respond with something such as the following: “But even
then, scales can sometimes be inaccurate and improperly calibrated, which could cause a
nefarious drug dealer to go free.” This hypothetical fear seems unjustified. See Frase, supra
note 289, at 359 (determining that drug amounts “will rarely be an issue in traffic cases”);
Logan, supra note 164, at 456 (noting that “such precise line-drawing is relatively rare in
the course of police work”).
292. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 349.
293. Id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Administrability

The Court ultimately rejected Atwater’s proposed rule due to administrability concerns.294 According to the Atwater majority,
“Atwater’s various distinctions between permissible and impermissible
arrests for minor crimes [were] ‘very unsatisfactory line[s]’ to require
police officers to draw on a moment’s notice.”295
Here, it becomes clear that the Court is rigging the rule—giving
the police a two-headed coin—so that whenever an officer is not absolutely certain whether he has the authority to arrest, the officer will win.
The officer can arrest the suspect without any consequence to the officer. If the officer is unsure whether arrest is appropriate, he need
not ponder or reflect: He automatically wins because making the police think is to put the police “in an almost impossible spot.”296 The
Court does not clarify exactly what is “impossible” about an officer’s
decision to arrest someone, knowing that, if he arrests the suspect
when it is not reasonable to do so, the officer may be subjected to a
lawsuit and any evidence seized as a result of the arrest might be excluded. Also, the doctrine of qualified immunity will protect the officer who guesses wrong in a close case—and, according to the Court,
all the cases are painfully close. The Court, however, actually dismissed the idea that qualified immunity would protect officers in a
footnote.297 Specifically, the Atwater majority was concerned that a
fear of liability may inhibit police officers from doing their job.298
This reasoning, of course, applies to some extent in practically all
actions taken by all government actors. The only way to eliminate the
“‘specter of liability’”299 would be to eliminate liability itself by granting blanket immunity to all government officials. The Court depicts
the law itself, at least the law that can hold a government official accountable to a citizen, as an evil and as an impediment to government
action. Moreover, the officer should not have to think at all. The
294. Id. at 350 (“Atwater’s rule therefore would not only place police in an almost impossible spot but would guarantee increased litigation over many of the arrests that would
occur.”).
295. Id. (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 157 (1925)).
296. Id. (emphasis added).
297. See id. at 351 n.22 (“The doctrine of qualified immunity is not the panacea the
dissent believes it to be.”). Frase suggests that the Court was troubled by the lower court’s
refusal to grant immunity for Officer Turek. Frase, supra note 289, at 362–63. As Frase
noted, six weeks after Atwater, the Court decided Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), which
“solved many of these problems by broadening the criteria establishing qualified immunity
and encouraging trial courts to rule on immunity claims at an early stage of litigation.”
Frase, supra note 289, at 362.
298. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 351 n.22.
299. Id. (quoting id. at 368 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
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officer is acting, after all, “on the spur (and in the heat) of the moment,”300 with “events . . . unfolding fast.”301 But would the officer
really be unable to tell whether the conduct qualified as worthy of
arrest? The nature of exceptional situations is that one can tell when
they arise, especially in a situation where it is necessary (or, if that
standard is too strict, “reasonable”) to arrest another human being.302
Whether imposing such harms on an individual is appropriate would
become clear in a given situation, even to an officer acting “on the
spur (and in the heat) of the moment.”303
Also, the Court’s concern that evidence might be excluded if a
police officer were deemed to have inappropriately arrested a person
seems improper. That is how the constitutional ball bounces—
though the exclusionary rule’s potency is dwindling.304 Unless the
Court actually, sub rosa, sees the rule it crafted in Atwater as a way of
sweeping up a large number of people in order to sort out the
“criminals,” then exclusion of evidence should not worry the Court.
Exclusion merely returns the police and the citizen to the status quo
ante. Nevertheless, when did excluding evidence for wrongful, unconstitutional police conduct become a negative to be thrown into the
balance?305 It only can be seen as a negative if the intention is to
sweep up a large number of individuals who are not clearly criminals.
In any event, there are several exceptions to the exclusionary rule,
and thus exclusion is not certain.306 Thus, the Court seems to fear
lawsuits against police and other litigation, presumably in the form of
suppression hearings, and the loss of evidence because the law prevents police from acting aggressively.
Is there anything inherently undesirable about the things that the
Court fears? If police violate citizens’ rights, the police should have to
answer for it in court if necessary. Police should feel “inhibit[ed]”307
300. Id. at 347.
301. Id. at 351 n.22.
302. Justice O’Connor discussed some consequences of arrest in her dissenting opinion.
See id. at 364–65 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Logan, supra note 164, at 432–34.
303. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347 (majority opinion).
304. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009) (holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence seized incident to an arrest that resulted from
negligent recordkeeping by police); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 601–02 (2006)
(holding that evidence obtained after the police’s violation of the “knock-and-announce”
rule is not subject to the exclusionary rule).
305. See DRIPPS, supra note 70, at 130 (“The Constitution, moreover, justifiably exalts security against false convictions and arbitrary restraint over the discovery of evidence of
guilt.”).
306. See, e.g., Hudson, 547 U.S. at 602 (suggesting that impermissible manner of entry
“does not necessarily trigger the exclusionary rule”).
307. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 351 n.22.
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in deciding whether to apply their powers. Such inhibition inheres in
the Bill of Rights. The same goes for loss of evidence, the possibility
of which is presumed in the Bill of Rights. For example, the Fourth
Amendment limits government authority to search,308 which means
that the government will not get to search citizens, homes, and persons for every bit of contraband—so this normal loss is hardly a cost to
be considered in the balance.309 What is wrong with litigation as a way
of proving any and all of the above? In fact, if the Court wishes to
limit docket growth,310 it should not eliminate litigation brought for
alleged violations of constitutional rights. Unfortunately, the Court
aimed to limit civil rights cases brought by individuals the Court does
not deem worthy of filing a lawsuit—individuals that the Court thinks
do not merit any consideration when they complain that they were
arrested for no reason and in a harassing manner, as Gail Atwater was.
These are the cases that the Court should be hearing. Instead, the
Court has prevented itself from being able to comment meaningfully
on the explosion of minor offenses and the increase in state and federal power to sweep up a large number of people for violating these
minor offenses.311
5. No “Tie Breaker”
The Court then considered, but abruptly rejected, a reasonable
solution—and made its antipathy to thinking by police clear by relying
once again on the anti-intellectual language from Belton:
One may ask, of course, why these difficulties may not
be answered by a simple tie breaker for the police to follow
in the field: if in doubt, do not arrest. The first answer is that
in practice the tie breaker would boil down to something
akin to a least-restrictive-alternative limitation, which is itself
one of those “ifs, ands, and buts” rules, New York v. Belton, 453
U.S., [sic] at 458, generally thought inappropriate in working out Fourth Amendment protection. Beyond that,
whatever help the tie breaker might give would come at the
308. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting “unreasonable searches and seizures”).
309. See DRIPPS, supra note 70, at 127 (suggesting that the balancing process is illegitimate and unwise because it considers constitutional violations to be “desirable” and
“view[s] the ‘loss’ of the evidence as a ‘cost,’” which translates into “treat[ing] the acquisition of the evidence as a gain”).
310. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 350 (noting that Atwater’s proposed rule would increase
litigation).
311. See Logan, supra note 164, at 458–59 (“In the wake of Atwater, jurisdictions can
continue to indulge their tendency to proliferate criminal laws without need for reflection.”). See generally Dubber, supra note 2, at 843–45 (discussing the various minor offenses
that have arisen from our “preventive regime of incapacitation”).
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price of a systematic disincentive to arrest in situations where
even Atwater concedes that arresting would serve an important societal interest. . . . Multiplied many times over, the
costs to society of such underenforcement could easily outweigh the costs to defendants of being needlessly arrested
and booked, as Atwater herself acknowledges.312
The tie breaker should not have been rejected; it makes good
sense. What the tie breaker would reflect is the norm that if the government cannot articulate, as Justice O’Connor suggested, a good reason to restrain a person’s liberty by arresting the person who has
committed a minor crime, the government should not arrest that person. We require at least reasonable suspicion for police to conduct a
Terry stop,313 which is far less intrusive than the full-blown arrest to
which Gail Atwater was subjected. It is irrelevant that the person arrested is or is not a “criminal”; for example, unlike in a Terry stop, law
enforcement may arrest a person based on probable cause that the
person simply committed a “crime.”314 Furthermore, the number
and variety of crimes have increased enormously over the years,315 and
many crimes denote conduct that is not harmful and does not stigmatize the accused. Violating what turns out to be a “public welfare offense,”316 a mere malum prohibitum rather than a malum in se, should
not automatically subject a person to an arrest.
This rejection reveals that anti-intellectualism turns out to be the
actual rationale for the Court’s decision. While the Court made a
move that looked like it was discussing appropriate constitutional
tests, in fact it was not. The Court stated that the tie breaker would be
“something akin” to a particular constitutional test.317 But the Court
312. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 350–51 (citations omitted). Notably, LaFave, who originated
this language, has written that the bright-line rule in Atwater fails to meet all of the necessary criteria for a bright-line rule. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.1(i) (4th ed. 2004); see also Nadine Strossen, The Fourth
Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative
Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1196 (1988) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s balancing analysis regarding the Fourth Amendment does not regularly take into account harm
to individual rights).
313. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
314. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354 (holding that Atwater’s arrest satisfied constitutional
requirements when the officer “had probable cause to believe that Atwater had committed
a crime in his presence”). It is hard to think of Gail Atwater as a criminal.
315. Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 703 (2005);
see also Logan, supra note 164, at 430–33 (noting that many arrests are made that are not
reported and stating that “even the reported case law suggests a markedly expansive use,
and apparent abuse, of the misdemeanor arrest power”).
316. Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56 & n.4 (1933).
317. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 350.
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did not remain on that topic and discuss that test; it simply said that
“something akin” to such a test would be an “if, and, and but” rule—
which the Court had already expressed disdain for earlier in the opinion and in Belton.318 Such a rule is “generally thought inappropriate”319 under the Fourth Amendment—but not necessarily. By
attaching consequences to the test, the Court avoided the rule that
would have required the police to think before arresting. The same
reasoning applied in Davis, which is discussed above: If there is doubt
about whether a suspect has requested an attorney, then the police do
not have to engage the doubt, but instead may proceed as if no attorney has been requested.320 The “cost” of adopting rather than dismissing a pro-civil liberties tie breaker would be that there would be
fewer arrests, where some of the foregone arrests could turn out to
have been, by the sheer force of dumb luck or an unarticulated
hunch, arrests that turned up a person suspected of another crime
and on the run, or contraband. This rank over-inclusiveness is what
the Court sought to engrave in the law in Atwater. It seems strange
that the Court is worried about under-enforcement. Even a casual reading of the Bill of Rights shows that the Constitution mandates underenforcement.321
Last, the Court placed undue emphasis on the fact that Atwater
“concede[d]” that some arrests made under this new over-inclusive
regime might benefit society. Here, the Court should have looked
beyond the arguments of Atwater herself.322 But the Court appears to
have limited itself to considering only what Atwater suggested. This
“non-thinking” by the Court made the opinion appear to be a contest
between the Court and Atwater.
The Court offered the consolation that the States could regulate
arrest through statutes and that doing so would be within their interest.323 Quoting Whren v. United States,324 the Court also noted that an
arrest of an individual is actionable if it is “‘conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to [his] privacy or even physical in318. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting Case-by-Case Adjudication,
supra note 104).
319. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 350.
320. See supra Part III.C.
321. See DRIPPS, supra note 70, at 130.
322. Cf. Frase, supra note 289, at 419 (“Supreme Court decisions are also strongly influenced by the arguments that the parties choose to make and emphasize.”). In addition to
criticizing the Court, Frase faulted Atwater and her supporting amici for not raising and
focusing on a winning argument. See id.
323. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 352.
324. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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terests.’”325 In Whren, however, the arrest was not ultimately
actionable.326 The unanimous Whren Court concluded that the defendants’ claim that they were pulled over based on racial animus is
not actionable under the Fourth Amendment because the officer’s
subjective intentions are irrelevant under Fourth Amendment analysis, and such a claim could be brought only under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.327 To do that, however,
the defendant would have to go well beyond his own case to find evidence of other racially-based traffic stops.328 Citing Graham v. Connor,329 the Court also pointed out that excessive force is “actionable”
under Section 1983.330 The Court then said, “The upshot of all these
influences, combined with the good sense (and, failing that, the political accountability) of most local lawmakers and law-enforcement officials, is a dearth of horribles demanding redress.”331
The putative promise of political accountability is chimerical.
Many of the people arrested will not seek accountability for a number
of reasons, including that they are poor and powerless, and some simply may be glad that they were not treated worse.332 Also, the “dearth
of horribles” is misleading. Although a reasonable observer might
have assumed that it is likely that there were very few arrests such as
Atwater’s, given that police might have doubted their authority to
make them, in fact there had been many such arrests.333 In any event,
the Court took an ex post view when it should have taken—as good
rule-creators should—an ex ante view. It should have seemed likely to
the Court at the time that, going forward, there would be a large number of such “horribles.” But by its opinion in Atwater, the Court erased
the language to talk about these “horribles” judicially. A person arrested unnecessarily, like Gail Atwater, cannot maintain a Section 1983 action based on a claim that an arrest was unnecessary.
Cases could only be brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, and
those cases would have to prove animus based on a suspect classification, a difficult endeavor.334
325. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 352–53 (alternation in original) (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at
818).
326. Whren, 517 U.S. at 819.
327. Id. at 813.
328. For a discussion of the difficulty of succeeding on an equal protection theory regarding pretextual stops, see Maclin, supra note 11, at 116–18.
329. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
330. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 395–96).
331. Id.
332. See Logan, supra note 164, at 448–49.
333. Id. at 430–33.
334. Maclin, supra note 11, at 116–18.
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It Is Not Really So Hard

As this Article has shown, the Court overcomplicated its analysis.335 It could have adopted Atwater’s proposed rule stemming from
reasonableness balancing, “forbidding custodial arrest, even upon
probable cause, when conviction could not ultimately carry any jail
time and when the government shows no compelling need for immediate detention.”336 In dissent, Justice O’Connor offered a slightly
more pro-police standard that is not overly complicated and might
even be an easy, case-by-case inquiry echoing the Terry standard:
[W]hen there is probable cause to believe that a fineonly offense has been committed, the police officer should
issue a citation unless the officer is “able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion” of a full custodial arrest.337
After all, we are talking about handcuffing a person and taking
her away to a jail, which can be a traumatic and dangerous experience.338 Indeed, some states do impose requirements on police
rather than offering them the “constitutional carte blanche”339 that
Justice O’Connor described the Court as giving police in Atwater.340
These requirements are preferable to no standard. The Court said it
was better for states, rather than the Court, to legislate in this area: “It
is of course easier to devise a minor-offense limitation by statute than
to derive one through the Constitution, simply because the statute can
let the arrest power turn on any sort of practical consideration without
having to subsume it under a broader principle.”341 Thus, according
to the Court, it is not too difficult, as a general principle, to exert
control over police arrest power. Moreover, is a broad, constitutional
principle so hard? After all, the principle would be less rigorous than
335. Frase, who was involved in the case as an amicus on the side of Atwater, said that
the Court might have seen the case as complex because Atwater and her supporting amici
presented the Court with a large number of possible options for rulemaking. Frase, supra
note 289, at 419. Frase, however, may be too solicitous of the Court.
336. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346.
337. Id. at 366 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
338. Id. at 364–65; see also Logan, supra note 164, at 433–34.
339. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 366.
340. See id. at 355–60 (Appendix to the Opinion of the Court); see also Frase, supra note
289, at nn.407–13.
341. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 352 (majority opinion). The idea of leaving it up to legislatures, long trying to appear “tough on crime”—particularly after 9/11—is of dubious
merit, however. See Logan, supra note 164, at 446–49.
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the one that a police officer must apply as a matter of constitutional
law when deciding whether to use deadly force against a fleeing suspect, according to the Court’s 1985 decision in Tennessee v. Garner.342
There, the officer is most likely to be under enormous stress, but
somehow can be expected to make such a prediction of future dangerousness.343 Regarding the rationale in Atwater that the suspect might
flee and not pay the fine, this does not seem to be a critical point
because the citation can simply be mailed to the person. A rule permitting arrest on these grounds would also work an injustice because
it would be applied disproportionately to people who are traveling
through the area or who appear poor and ultimately unable to pay.
Thus, it would not be hard to require some thinking by police, who are,
after all, acting without warrants and who are observing offenses for
which there often is no evidence beyond the officer’s observations:
Consider victimless crimes such as not wearing a seatbelt, speeding,
failing to signal, and the like. There is too much room for abuse, for
trumped-up arrests.344 An objective standard would benefit the citizen and serve as a brake—or at least a speed bump—against police
abuse of power.
7. Just Sweep the Streets
Justice Souter was ultimately sanguine about Gail Atwater’s tribulation. For example, he wrote, “The arrest and booking were inconvenient and embarrassing to Atwater, but not so extraordinary as to
violate the Fourth Amendment.”345 Perhaps the arrest qua arrest was
not extraordinary,346 but the fact of the matter is that an arrest is extraordinary—at least before Atwater. The Court treated arrest dismissively, as if it were just another government function such as passing
through customs, undergoing a health inspection, or registering a car.
342. 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not
constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.”); see also Logan,
supra note 164, at 458 (discussing how “such judgments permeate everyday police work, for
example, in assessing probable cause and reasonable suspicion, and even in the high-stakes
decision of whether deadly force is permissible”).
343. Moreover, it appears that this decision whether to shoot, to apply this restraint
under the Fourth Amendment, is something of a “less-restrictive-alternative limitation” that
is “one of those ‘ifs, ands, and buts’ rules generally thought inappropriate in working out
Fourth Amendment protection.” Atwater, 532 U.S. at 350 (citation omitted) (quoting New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)).
344. TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 239 (discussing police “testilying”).
345. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 355.
346. For various accounts of Fourth Amendment violations, see JAMES BOVARD, LOST
RIGHTS: THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LIBERTY 227–57 (1994).
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But an arrest is something more. It is a function reserved for the criminal or the outlaw and not for the ordinary citizen or the “soccer
mom” as Gail Atwater has been described.347
In Atwater, the Court based its rule on the goal that police do not
have to think about the propriety of whether to arrest a person who
has committed a minor traffic violation in the officer’s presence. To
think would be to hesitate, and perhaps, to decide not to arrest. The
result might be a loss of evidence—usually contraband—that the government otherwise would not have obtained. Then, society would
lose this putative benefit to its safety. No risk that crime may occur
can be allowed.348 In other words, Atwater stands for the proposition
that the Court believes that thinking might impede the smooth, efficient exercise of state power.349 Smooth operation of state power, or
“administrability,” is an important concern in the War on Crime.
Whether there is collateral damage to people like Gail Atwater is of no
concern to the Court.
E. Devenpeck v. Alford: The Rookie Cop Standard Becomes the Law
In Devenpeck v. Alford,350 the Court repeated the mantra that what
an officer thinks does not matter351 and emphasized that only the ob347. Logan, supra note 164, at 419; Barton Aronson, Why the “Soccer Mom” Should Win the
Seat-Belt Case: The Problem with Custodial Arrests for Offenses That Are Not Punishable with Jail
Time, FINDLAW’S WRIT, Dec. 15, 2000, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/aronson/
20001215.html.
348. For an interesting account of the government’s intolerance of a risk of a terror
attack post-9/11, see RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA’S
PURSUIT OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11 62, 79, 123–24, 213–16 (2006) (discussing the Bush
Administration’s policy of a refusal to tolerate even a one percent risk of a terror attack
after 9/11—a one percent risk would be treated as a certainty, and all action would be
taken to prevent the harm from occurring).
349. See Logan, supra note 164, at 465 (“In announcing its bright-line rule—that any and
all legal violations can justify warrantless custodial arrest—the Court underscored its determination to withdraw from its oversight of the daily work of police.”); see also Frase, supra
note 289, at 415 (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Atwater makes little sense based on the
facts of the Petitioner’s case, creates substantial potential for abuse of the arrest power, and
is not supported by the reasons stated in Justice Souter’s majority opinion.”).
350. 543 U.S. 146 (2004).
351. See id. at 153 (“Our cases make clear that an arresting officer’s state of mind . . . is
irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.”). Scholars have seized the opportunity to
critique this “mantra.” See, e.g., John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70,
123 (1982) (arguing that it should not be considered “heresy” to argue that an officer’s
subjective state of mind may be considered and that some searches such as bad faith
searches should be unconstitutional); George E. Dix, Subjective “Intent” as a Component of
Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 76 MISS. L.J. 373, 388, 472 (2006) (“[R]easonableness
might properly require a showing that a sweep was in fact motivated by actual concern [of
harm to others].”).
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jective facts matter.352 The facts of this case are curious. Jerome Alford, a regular citizen, helped stranded motorists change a tire.353 As
the police came upon the stranded motorists, Alford quickly drove
away.354 After the police learned that Alford had helped and that the
stranded motorists believed Alford was a police officer, the police
found Alford and pulled him over.355 While questioning him about
their belief that he was impersonating a police officer, the officers became distracted when they saw that Alford was tape recording the encounter.356 The police believed such recording violated Washington’s
privacy law.357 The officers arrested Alford for that, despite Alford’s
protest that taping roadside conversations with police was not illegal
in Washington according to a Washington state court opinion—a
copy of which Alford said he had in his car.358 He filed a lawsuit
under Section 1983 but lost and appealed, arguing that no evidence
supported the jury’s verdict.359 The police made two arguments on
appeal: (1) there was, after all, probable cause to arrest Alford—for
impersonating a police officer and obstructing a police officer; and
(2) the officers had qualified immunity.360 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that there was
probable cause because the two offenses, impersonating a police officer and obstructing a police officer, were not “closely related” to the
alleged violation of the state privacy law for which Alford was in fact
arrested.361 The court also rejected the police officers’ defense of
qualified immunity because “no objectively reasonable officer could
have concluded that arresting [respondent] for taping the traffic stop
was permissible” given the case law.362 The court therefore reversed
the jury’s verdict after it concluded that no evidence supported it.363
The Supreme Court, per Justice Scalia, reversed. The effect of
the holding was that because the police had probable cause for some352. Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153.
353. Id. at 148.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 148–49.
356. Id. at 149.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 149–50. Alford was correct. Id. at 151 (explaining that the jury was instructed
that Alford’s taping was not a crime).
359. Id. at 151–52 (noting that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
jury’s verdict against Alford on this ground).
360. Id. at 152.
361. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alford v. Haner, 333 F.3d 972, 976
(9th Cir. 2003)).
362. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alford, 333
F.3d at 979).
363. Id.
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thing, whether they knew the law or not, and regardless of whether
they had informed Alford that his committing these two offenses—
impersonating a police officer and obstructing a police officer—was
the reason for his arrest, the arrest was proper. Justice Scalia reasoned
that a police officer’s subjective state of mind does not matter.364 Instead, he explained, “‘[E]venhanded law enforcement is best
achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather
than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the
officer.’”365 He rejected the Ninth Circuit’s decision that probable
cause for impersonating a police officer could not suffice here to justify the arrest because it was not “closely related” to the crime for
which Alford was arrested366—the “closely related” requirement presumably would give an arrestee some notice of why he had been taken
into custody. According to Justice Scalia, such a requirement could
not stand because the determination of whether the offense later used
to justify the arrest was “closely related” to the offense given to the
arrestee as the reason for the arrest depends on the officer’s subjective intent.367
Justice Scalia noted that to base the legality of an arrest on
whether the officer told the suspect the correct legal reason for which
he was arresting him could lead to, inter alia, future situations in which
an arrest made by a veteran with a wide knowledge of different crimes
would be valid, “whereas an arrest made by a rookie [who did not
know the law] in precisely the same circumstances would not.”368 The
Court declined to “ascribe to the Fourth Amendment such arbitrarily
variable protection.”369 Thus, according to the Devenpeck Court, an
officer’s experience and training do not seem to matter. The Court
made it so that a rookie can have her arrests validated, even if she was
wrong at the time. As for the citizen, however, there is no second
chance: A citizen who commits a crime apparently does not deserve
one.370 What of the citizen’s need for notice of why he was arrested?
According to the Devenpeck Court, there is no constitutional right to

364. Id. at 153 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996)).
365. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138
(1990)).
366. Id. at 152.
367. Id. at 153–54.
368. Id. at 154.
369. Id.
370. See id. at 155 (“Those are lawfully arrested whom the facts known to the arresting
officers give probable cause to arrest.”).
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know the charge at the time of arrest.371 Therefore, the Court found
intolerable any rule that would invalidate an arrest justified by an offense not closely related to the offense that the officer initially informed the arrestee he had committed.372 The Court explained that
such a rule would create “perverse consequences,” as police would either give no reasons or give as many reasons as they possibly could.373
Such results, however, seem unlikely if the officer is required to give
the correct reason for the arrest. No silence would be allowed, and a
jumble of reasons, if incorrect, could not validate the arrest. The officer would have to effectuate the arrest based on what he thinks are
proper legal reasons.
As for when the citizen must find out why he was arrested, Justice
Scalia cited County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,374 stating that Alford or
other such citizens “will not be left to wonder for long” as to why they
were arrested because, constitutionally, there had to be a prompt
probable cause hearing where they could find out.375 The McLaughlin
rule, however, regards holding an arrestee for up to forty-eight hours
before such a hearing as presumptively reasonable.376
Therefore, Devenpeck nixed any requirement that the police need
to know the law.377 The Court said it would not let a rookie officer’s
lack of knowledge of the law invalidate an arrest. There is, then, no
requirement that the police should try to discuss with the suspect the
reason for the arrest. That is unfortunate because such discussion
could reveal that the police were making a mistake that they could
remedy by releasing the suspect on the spot. To require the police to
371. Id. Justice Scalia did note, however, that “it is assuredly good police practice to
inform a person of the reason for his arrest at the time he is taken into custody.” Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.; see infra Part V (discussing the desirability of having government actors provide
reasons to individuals when imposing substantial burdens).
374. 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
375. Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 155 n.3 (quoting McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 53). This hearing is
held pursuant to Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), which explains that a state “must
provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint . . . and this determination must be made by a judicial officer either
before or promptly after arrest.” Id. at 125.
376. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56–57 (holding that the arrestee has the burden to prove
that a delay within that time period is unreasonable; after forty-eight hours, “the burden
shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other
extraordinary circumstance”).
377. Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153 (“As we have repeatedly explained, ‘the fact that the
officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide
the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as
the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.’” (quoting Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996))).
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think, as we have seen, is bad in the eyes of the Court; so is putting any
value in what police think. If a citizen engages in conduct that is a
crime—any crime—then arrest is proper, even if neither he nor the
police know why he was arrested. As long as a court can figure it out
later, then the arrest is proper. This result echoes Jeremy Bentham’s
Panopticon378 or George Orwell’s Big Brother379: The citizen is observed at all times. The police do not have to know the law; rather,
they just need to have a gut feeling or a hunch that something is
amiss. Then, the machinery of search incident to arrest, interrogation, and trial will be set in motion. No evidence will be lost.
It seems, however, that the police should only arrest people if
they have good reason to conclude that a crime has been committed.
Taken to its extreme, the police might arrest anybody for any conduct
they find disagreeable, or feel might possibly be criminal, in the hope
that a court would be solicitous and determine that a crime, any
crime, was actually committed.380 The citizen might be held while police and prosecutors try to ascribe criminality to the conduct.381 The
message to police is the following: Do not think, just arrest. The
court will do the thinking for you.
F. Virginia v. Moore: “State Law Can Be Complicated Indeed”
In 2008, the Supreme Court once again relied on anti-intellectualism to uphold broad arrest power. After David Lee Moore was arrested for driving with a suspended license, a search turned up sixteen
grams of crack cocaine and over five hundred dollars in cash.382
Moore later challenged the search as the fruit of an illegal arrest because Virginia law prohibits arrest for driving with a suspended license
except under certain circumstances that the Commonwealth did not
378. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON Writings (Miran Bozovic ed., 1995).
379. See ORWELL, supra note 111, at 1–2 (“Big Brother Is Watching You”).
380. Although extreme, such police conduct is possible. George Dix, on the other
hand, has characterized such an argument as “fanciful.” Dix, supra note 351, at 465–66
(characterizing and agreeing with LaFave’s argument regarding this topic). Despite views
to the contrary, an officer might use arrest as a means to harass. Moreover, an officer who
is intent on harassing an individual may even engage in “testilying” about the individual’s
conduct. See supra note 3. Devenpeck would seem to give the officer more time to invent a
story.
381. Cf. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56 (“Examples of unreasonable delay [within the fortyeight hour period to establish probable cause] are delays for the purpose of gathering
additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested
individual, or delay for delay’s sake.”). Devenpeck would appear to permit delay for officials
to decide how to charge the person they have arrested.
382. Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1601 (2008). The search was of his hotel room
rather than his car; Moore gave consent for the search. Id. at 1601 n.1.
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claim existed in this case.383 Under Virginia law, a police officer cannot arrest a motorist for driving with a suspended license unless the
motorist “fail[s] or refuse[s] to discontinue” the violation, the officer
believes the motorist is “likely to disregard a summons,” or the officer
reasonably believes the motorist is “likely to cause harm to himself or
to any other person.”384 Here, the arresting officer did not have reason to believe that any of these problems were likely to occur with
Moore. The reasoning required by this Virginia law turns out to be
the very sort of reasoning by a police officer that the Atwater Court
said was too difficult for a police officer to carry out,385 but the Court
did not mention that here.
In a 9-0 ruling, with a majority opinion by Justice Scalia and Justice Ginsburg concurring in the judgment, the Court ruled that the
Fourth Amendment was not violated by the police’s violation of Virginia law and that the evidence would not be excluded.386 The Court
came to this conclusion by reasoning that because history did not provide a clear answer,387 the Court would apply “traditional standards of
reasonableness” by assessing the intrusion upon an individual’s privacy and the legitimate governmental interests at stake.388 The Court
explained, “[W]hen an officer has probable cause to believe a person
committed even a minor crime in his presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally
reasonable.”389
The Court still had to deal with the question of the state law prohibition. The Court pointed to precedent that held that the Fourth
Amendment does not rely on state law,390 and explained that to exclude the evidence here would frustrate state policy because Virginia
did not itself use exclusion as a remedy for a violation of the no-arrest
law.391
The consequence was that the Fourth Amendment was not affected by state law,392 perhaps especially where the state law does not
require excluding the evidence.393 The Court held that an officer
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

Id. at 1602.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74 (2008).
See supra Part III.D.
Moore, 128 S. Ct. at 1608.
Id. at 1604.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1604–05.
Id. at 1606.
Id. at 1607.
See id. at 1606.
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may arrest for any misdemeanor committed in his or her presence.394
Whether a state desired to give more protections than the Fourth
Amendment provides, such as by making some offenses non-incarcerable, is of no matter under the Fourth Amendment.395 The anti-intellectualism was subtler here than in Atwater, but that is probably
because it did not need to be so pronounced. In reasoning that the
Fourth Amendment should not turn on state law, Justice Scalia wrote
the following:
Even if we thought that state law changed the nature of the
Commonwealth’s interests for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, we would adhere to the probable-cause standard. In determining what is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, we have given great weight to the “essential interest in readily administrable rules.”396
Referring to Atwater, Justice Scalia wrote the following: “If the constitutionality of arrest for minor offenses turned in part on inquiries as to
risk of flight and danger of repetition, officers might be deterred from
making legitimate arrests. We found little to justify this cost . . . .”397
According to the Atwater Court, the officer would be either deterred
because of the “specter of liability” from a Section 1983 suit or because of the exclusion of the evidence.398 Reflection is therefore bad
where it might prevent police from exercising power.399 What is interesting here is that Virginia itself had decided to risk this cost by enacting a no-arrest statute,400 aiming to either save the money incurred in
full-blown custody arrests or to protect privacy more fully than the
Fourth Amendment.401
394. Id. at 1604.
395. Id. at 1608.
396. Id. at 1606 (quoting Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001)).
397. Id. (citation omitted).
398. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 351 n.22.
399. See id. at 351 (“[W]hatever help the tie breaker might give would come at the price
of a systematic disincentive to arrest in situations where even Atwater concedes that arresting would serve an important societal interest.”).
400. Indeed, the Moore Court observed the following:
The Virginia statute . . . calls on law enforcement officers to weigh just the sort of
case-specific factors that Atwater said would deter legitimate arrests if made part of
the constitutional inquiry. It would authorize arrest if a misdemeanor suspect
fails or refuses to discontinue the unlawful act, or if the officer believes the suspect to be likely to disregard a summons.
Moore, 128 S. Ct. at 1606.
401. See id. at 1605–06 (“Arrest ensures that a suspect appears to answer charges and
does not continue a crime, and it safeguards evidence and enables officers to conduct an
in-custody investigation.” (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 177–202 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965))).
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But none of that mattered. The Court continued with the
following:
Incorporating state-law arrest limitations into the Constitution would produce a constitutional regime no less vague
and unpredictable than the one we rejected in Atwater. The
constitutional standard would be only as easy to apply as the
underlying state law, and state law can be complicated indeed.
The Virginia statute in this case, for example, calls on law
enforcement officers to weigh just the sort of case-specific
factors that Atwater said would deter legitimate arrests if
made part of the constitutional inquiry.402
The Court relied on its trope of over-complicating, as it did in
Atwater, when it stated that “state law can be complicated indeed.”403
Apparently, Virginia did not find the law too complex when deciding
to enact it. So why should the Court second-guess the Virginia legislature, rather than applying principles of respect and comity?404 Here,
the state law is not so hard to apply—we do not know why the officer
violated it. Perhaps it was due to confusion or willfulness.
Under Virginia law, the officer must make the same sort of determination that officers must make in deciding whether to conduct a
Terry stop or frisk, or a full-blown search or seizure: There must be
some coherent reason to intrude. That type of thinking is not too
difficult for police officers. Moreover, Justice Scalia did not specifically argue that this law was too complicated. It is therefore unclear
how legitimate arrests would be deterred any more than legitimate
Terry stop and frisks would be deterred because police feared they did
not have reasonable suspicion. This is how things work whenever
there is a standard. Such standards exist to protect citizens from government intrusion. Ultimately, in a nation that honors limited government, police should be hesitant to arrest, stop, or search.
The Moore Court dwelled on the purported complexity of applying state law, which affects police and judges:
Finally, linking Fourth Amendment protections to state
law would cause them to “vary from place to place and from
time to time” . . . . Even at the same place and time, the
Fourth Amendment’s protections might vary if federal of402. Id. at 1606 (emphasis added).
403. Id.
404. See id. at 1604 (“Our decisions counsel against changing this calculus when a State
chooses to protect privacy beyond the level that the Fourth Amendment requires. We have
treated additional protections exclusively as matters of state law.”).
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ficers were not subject to the same statutory constraints as
state officers.405
Again, linking the protections of the Fourth Amendment to state
law is not so complicated as the Court says; nor is consistency even a
constitutional requirement. First, some Fourth Amendment protections are linked to state law. All arrests are. If the officers in Moore,
Atwater, or Devenpeck had arrested a person for conduct that was not a
crime under state or federal law, both of which the officer might enforce, then those arrests would not have been legal. Yet, an arrest in a
neighboring state for the same conduct where the conduct was illegal
would have been a legal arrest under the Fourth Amendment. State
law would have been decisive. Moreover, Fourth Amendment law
concerning whether the event of police officers opening containers
found in an inventory search of an impounded automobile is constitutional has hinged on the particular police department’s rules and
whether those rules give officers too much discretion.406 Such variety
can cause the Fourth Amendment to vary from town to town. State
law may also be dispositive with regard to other Fourth Amendment
issues, such as Section 1983 cases regarding excessive force in arrest.407 As Wayne Logan has stated, “[T]he court has not spoken with
one voice on this important question . . . .”408 Likewise, and contrary
to the Court’s concern, federal officers often operate under different
“statutory constraints”409 than state officers. Furthermore, given that
federal agents are less likely to pull over cars for traffic violations than
are state and municipal police, this rationale does not appear to apply
in Moore. In most cases, individual police officers will not trouble
themselves with the differing standards. For instance, the Virginia officer in Virginia would know that he or she must follow Virginia law,
whereas the South Dakota officer in South Dakota would know that he
or she must follow South Dakota law.
405. Id. at 1607 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996)).
406. Compare Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1990) (suppressing evidence because
police opened a container found in an inventory search when there was no department
policy on this issue, thus conferring too much discretion), with Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367, 369 (1987) (declining to suppress evidence found in a container in an inventory
search because police followed the department’s standardized procedure that mandated
opening the container).
407. See, e.g., Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 364 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that “§ 1983
actions that are premised upon traditional torts generally incorporate the law of the pertinent state jurisdiction” and applying New York’s statutory definition of deadly physical
force).
408. Logan, supra note 164, at 449–51 (cataloging Supreme Court cases that show deference to state law and those that do not).
409. Moore, 128 S. Ct. at 1607.

R
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In addition, federal judges could initially work to gain familiarity
with the underlying state law issue. In Moore, however, it is as if the
Justices did not want to have to adjudicate a complex Fourth Amendment issue on differing grounds.
At the end of the day, the Court could have formulated a simple
answer or a bright-line rule. It could have simply concluded that a
search incident to a legal arrest is not valid if the arrest itself is not
legal, and that constitutionality can turn on state law. This proposed
rule would better effectuate state policy by honoring state law rather
than ignoring it. It should not matter that some states such as Virginia
do not provide exclusion as a remedy for a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.410 Perhaps the lawmakers believed that exclusion would
occur under the Fourth Amendment rather than under Virginia law.
It may also be that state lawmakers would leave out exclusion as a way
of avoiding the political fallout from such a rule and would instead
leave it to the Constitution to require such exclusion. Such apparent
political maneuvering is certainly not commendable, but it is something that the Court might have considered to have occurred. Instead, the Court comprehensively blocked the protections of the
Fourth Amendment to any citizen who suffers a full custody arrest in
violation of the laws of their own state, which could be seen as a police
officer’s overreach under the color of state law. As a result of its ruling, the Moore Court not only blocked the possibility of excluding the
evidence seized from Moore, but it blocked any Section 1983 suit he
might have filed.
Rather than aiming to prevent state law involvement in the
Fourth Amendment, the Court is instead seeking to inhibit the requirement of rigorous thinking on the part of police. This is evident
given that state law is already involved in some Fourth Amendment
cases. Any rigorous thinking might give the officer pause in deciding
whether to arrest. It is as if the Court wanted to maintain the power of
law enforcement to sweep up suspected misdemeanants without hesitation and with impunity.411 Of course, in Moore, the Court saw the
scenario of what it explicitly sought to avoid by its ruling in Atwater—a
Section 1983 case—which gave police the power to sweep up citizens,
thereby reflecting a loss of evidence. If Moore had not been arrested
for a traffic violation, he would not have been searched, and the con410. See id. at 1606 (“Virginia does not, for example, ordinarily exclude from criminal
trials evidence obtained in violation of its statutes.”).
411. This power is similar to the broad powers conferred on police by vagrancy laws
such as the one the Court struck down as overbroad in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156, 165–68 (1972).
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traband would not have been found. The Court apparently found it
necessary to avoid this situation.
Did the Court in fact err in its holding? It is perhaps logical that
since Virginia would not exclude the evidence obtained as a result of
the illegal arrest under Virginia law, then the Supreme Court of the
United States should not provide more protection than Virginia provided.412 In fact, Justice Ginsburg’s line of reasoning in her concurring opinion reflects this assertion.413 Given that the antiintellectualism seems unnecessary to the holding, why then did the
Court decide to include it? Perhaps the rhetoric was seen as necessary
to convince observers who found it hard to let go of the syllogistic
argument about searches incident to legal arrest.
In any event, Moore’s legacy will be that a police officer, as far as
the Fourth Amendment is concerned, need not follow, much less
know, his or her own state laws.414 This is another way of saying that
the Court need not consider this category of government conduct, or
the violation of state no-arrest laws, in the future.
IV. THINKING ABOUT

A

SUSPECT’S RIGHTS IS POSSIBLE: TWO CASES

The Supreme Court’s anti-intellectualism in the cases examined
above was unwarranted because there were no exigencies that required immediate, automatic, even robotic, action by police. It is
merely the Court’s policy preference that police need not consider
suspects’ rights in certain situations. This preference is clearly evident
in the Court’s reasoning in two cases where the Court eschewed antiintellectualism and required police to think about suspects’ rights—
even when an exigency was clearly involved.
A. Tennessee v. Garner: Police Can Make Split-Second Decisions
After All
If the anti-intellectualism in the prior cases is to be believed, the
Supreme Court has held—albeit inexplicably—that police are capable
of meaningful reflection and accurate discernment in cases involving
412. See Moore, 128 S. Ct. at 1609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Moore
would have us ignore, however, the limited consequences Virginia attaches to a police
officer’s failure to follow the Commonwealth’s summons-only instruction.”).
413. See id. (“The Fourth Amendment . . . does not put States to an all-or-nothing
choice . . . . A state may accord protection against arrest beyond what the Fourth Amendment requires, yet restrict the remedies available when police deny to persons they apprehend the extra protection state law orders.”).
414. Id. at 1602 (majority opinion) (“Under state law, the officers should have issued
Moore a summons instead of arresting him.” (emphasis added)).
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the use of deadly force. In Tennessee v. Garner,415 the Supreme Court,
per Justice White, announced the following at the onset of its opinion:
This case requires us to determine the constitutionality
of the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed suspected felon. We conclude that such force
may not be used unless it is necessary to prevent the escape
and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect
poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury
to the officer or others.416
In Garner, a police officer responded to a burglary.417 He saw the
burglar flee and shot him in the back of the head as he tried to climb
a fence.418 The burglar turned out to be an unarmed teenager.419
The Court concluded that history did not provide an answer because historical circumstances such as police weaponry and the definition of felony had changed.420 It went on to balance the
reasonableness of the intrusion. Given that several states and police
departments limit police use of deadly force,421 the Court imposed
limits on the police:
The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony
suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that all felony suspects die than
that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate
threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of
deadly force to do so. It is no doubt unfortunate when a
suspect who is in sight escapes, but the fact that the police
arrive a little late or are a little slower afoot does not always
justify killing the suspect. A police officer may not seize an
unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead. The
Tennessee statute is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes
the use of deadly force against such fleeing suspects.
It is not, however, unconstitutional on its face. Where
the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect
poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer
or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

471 U.S. 1 (1985).
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 13–16.
Id. at 18–19.
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threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable
cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the
infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm,
deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and
if, where feasible, some warning has been given. As applied
in such circumstances, the Tennessee statute would pass constitutional muster.422
At this point, the limits might seem strange: The police officer is
expected to apply the same reasoning that was deemed practically impossible in Atwater and other cases? Here, the suspect is more likely to
be dangerous, as he is committing a felony and is fleeing. Conversely,
in Atwater, the Court allowed the arrest of any misdemeanant who was
already under police control without any evidence (much less probable cause) that the misdemeanant posed a danger, would continue
the offense, or would not return for trial.423
Granted, the suspect’s interest is greater here than the liberty interest in Atwater. Nevertheless, the differences reflect the Court’s antipathy to less significant constitutional rights, as those interfere with
police prevention of danger and crime-prevention, including minor
crimes.424
422. Id. at 11–12.
423. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340 (2001) (“We simply cannot
conclude that the Fourth Amendment, as originally understood, forbade peace officers to
arrest without a warrant for misdemeanors not amounting to or involving breach of the
peace.”).
424. The extent to which Garner controls police use of deadly force in contexts differing
from that of Garner is now unclear. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382–83 (2007) (stating
that Garner was simply an application of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness balancing test in a particular circumstance). In Harris, the Court engaged in reasonableness balancing in the context of a high-speed car chase in which police rammed the car driven by a
man who had been speeding and had fled when pursued by police for more than ten miles
at a speed exceeding eighty-five miles per hour. Id. at 374–75. Here, the Court also engaged in reasonableness balancing, id. at 381, when making the following holding: “A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives
of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the
fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” Id. at 386.
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer, who agreed with Justice Ginsburg’s separate concurrence, stated that this holding was “too absolute.” Id. at 389 (Breyer, J., concurring). In
her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg underscored that she did “not read today’s decision as articulating a mechanical, per se rule,” and that a closer look at the circumstances of
the chase would be necessary. Id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
That said, one might ask if the police or courts will engage in much deliberation
regarding high-speed car chases. Harris has a certain degree of anti-intellectualism in that
the Court, in an 8-1 decision, decided that the case was simple. Having watched the police
dashboard’s videotape of the events, the Court stated, “We are happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself.” Id. at 378 n.5 (majority opinion). Based on its view of the video,
the Court reversed the lower courts’ holdings that summary judgment was not warranted
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B. Berkemer v. McCarty: “The Doctrinal Complexities That Would
Confront the Courts If We Accepted [the Police] Proposal Would
Be Byzantine”
An alternative to anti-intellectualism in criminal procedure is
presented in Berkemer v. McCarty,425 a Miranda case with Fourth
Amendment overtones, which was decided after Belton and Gates. The
case is notable because while Justice Marshall, who wrote for the
Court, expressed concern that the rules proposed by the litigants
might be difficult to administer because police would have to think,
the case is not anti-intellectual. Rather, the Court unapologetically
left police with a rule that gave them the responsibility to think.
In Berkemer, the question was whether a motorist, Richard McCarty, who was pulled over after an Ohio State Highway Patrol officer
observed him commit a misdemeanor traffic offense, was “in custody”
for the purposes of Miranda.426 When the officer observed that McCarty appeared intoxicated, he gave him a field sobriety test, which
McCarty failed.427 The officer questioned McCarty and received incriminating responses that McCarty had been drinking beer and
smoking marijuana.428 The officer arrested McCarty and took him to
a county jail where he was tested for alcohol and booked, and where
he made more incriminating remarks.429 McCarty was never given Miin this case and concluded that no reasonable juror could find that the police’s use of
deadly force was not justified. Id. at 386.
But there was further thinking to be done. As Dan Kahan, David Hoffman, and Donald Braman have argued, the majority arrogated to itself a question that might be answered
differently by different people, depending on the views those people have regarding various issues, including the proper relationship between police and citizens. See Dan M.
Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive
Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841 (2009). Justice Scalia wrote that the police chase
was “a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort,” Harris, 550 U.S. at 380,
whereas Justice Stevens took a more sanguine view, see id. at 390 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Might the Court’s 8-1 holding encourage police to view most car chases as seriously dangerous so that they may employ deadly force to stop the fleeing driver? If so, might this case
result in car chases being classified under a bright-line rule?
For a discussion that Harris has essentially overruled Garner, see Note, Retreat: The Supreme Court and the New Police, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1723–26 & n.19 (2009) (citing recent
deadly force cases in which courts have focused on Harris).
425. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
426. Id. at 422–24. The Miranda warnings were designed to counter the coercion inherent in custodial police interrogation; there is no need for police to give the warnings unless
there is both custody and interrogation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441 (1966)
(exploring the issue of “applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody
interrogation”).
427. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 423.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 423–24.
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randa warnings.430 McCarty moved to suppress his statements but
failed and was subsequently convicted.431 The Court granted certiorari to “resolve confusion . . . regarding the applicability of our ruling
in Miranda to interrogations involving minor offenses and to questioning of motorists detained pursuant to traffic stops.”432
The Court decided that police can think. The clarity of the rule
was important, Justice Marshall wrote, but the Court drew the clarity
in a particular way. Instead of adopting the blanket rules that the
parties suggested, the Court came out somewhere in the middle—in
the situational land of “it depends.” The county sheriff suggested the
rule that any arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation is not “custody”
for the purposes of Miranda, so the person arrested may be interrogated without warnings.433 McCarty suggested the alternative rule
that all “roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a
routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation.”434
The Court concluded that whether a person was in custody for the
purposes of Miranda depended on the circumstances:
[T]he safeguards . . . become applicable as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a “degree associated
with formal arrest.” If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment
that renders him “in custody” for practical purposes, he will
be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by
Miranda.435
That is, the Court did not express the antipathy to “it depends”
thinking the way it had in Belton and the way it would in Atwater, Davis,
and Moore. Justice Marshall explained the following:
Admittedly, our adherence to the doctrine just recounted will mean that the police and lower courts will con430. Id. at 424.
431. Id. at 424–25.
432. Id. at 426–27 (footnote call numbers omitted).
433. Id. at 429. The sheriff actually offered other distinctions, such as making an exception only for driving while intoxicated, or drawing the “line between felonies and misdemeanors.” Id. at 429 n.11. The Court refused to take the bait and said that it would not
differentiate between the suggestions, which all “suffer[ed] from similar infirmities.” Id.
434. Id. at 435 (citation omitted). The Court noted that this may have been somewhat
qualified. Id. at 435 n.22 (“In his brief, respondent [McCarty] hesitates to embrace this
proposition fully, advocating instead a more limited rule [that would limit application of
Miranda to only those situations in which] the police officer had probable cause to arrest
the motorist for a crime.”). The Court noted that such a rule would be difficult to administer because the officer would have to monitor the information as it flowed to him and
determine when there was probable cause. Id.
435. Id. at 440 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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tinue occasionally to have difficulty deciding exactly when a
suspect has been taken into custody. Either a rule that Miranda applies to all traffic stops or a rule that a suspect need
not be advised of his rights until he is formally placed under
arrest would provide a clearer, more easily administered line.
However, each of these two alternatives has drawbacks that
make it unacceptable. The first would substantially impede
the enforcement of the Nation’s traffic laws—by compelling
the police either to take the time to warn all detained motorists of their constitutional rights or to forgo use of self-incriminating statements made by those motorists—while
doing little to protect citizens’ Fifth Amendment rights. The
second would enable the police to circumvent the constraints on custodial interrogations established by
Miranda.436
It is not the best possible rule for citizens. The best rule would
have been McCarty’s: All traffic stops that involve questioning are considered custody for purposes of Miranda.437 But the Court likened
those stops to Terry stops—a lower level of restraint—for which Miranda warnings were not required.438 Nevertheless, the Court at least
concluded that some of the stops would be custody, whereas under the
sheriff’s proposed rule, no formal arrests for misdemeanor traffic offenses would be custody.439 Had the Court followed the path it had
carved in Belton, it would have simply given police the power to interrogate without warnings in any traffic stop.
Perhaps this case is different from the other, pro-police cases discussed because the Court may have determined that there was not, in
almost two decades after Miranda, significant confusion in determining whether a suspect was in custody; thus, the Court actually went
with a fairly clear rule. It may be that the Fifth Amendment right is
seen as more important than the Fourth Amendment right, although
the 1994 pro-police Davis decision makes such a pronouncement difficult to sustain.440 Or perhaps Justice Marshall performed his own jiu
jitsu on the pro-police Justices by showing that complexities arising
from the purportedly pro-police rule could lead to a loss of evidence.
Concerning the rule proposed by the sheriff, Justice Marshall penned
the following:
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See

at 441.
at 435.
at 439–40.
at 429.
supra Part III.C.
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The police often are unaware when they arrest a person
whether he may have committed a misdemeanor or a felony.
Consider, for example, the reasonably common situation in
which the driver of a car involved in an accident is taken into
custody. Under Ohio law, both driving while under the influence of intoxicants and negligent vehicular homicide are
misdemeanors, while reckless vehicular homicide is a felony.
When arresting a person for causing a collision, the police
may not know which of these offenses he may have committed. Indeed, the nature of his offense may depend upon circumstances unknowable to the police, such as whether the
suspect has previously committed a similar offense or has a
criminal record of some other kind. It may even turn upon
events yet to happen, such as whether a victim of the accident dies. It would be unreasonable to expect the police to
make guesses as to the nature of the criminal conduct at issue before deciding how they may interrogate the suspect.
Equally importantly, the doctrinal complexities that would confront the courts if we accepted petitioner’s proposal would be Byzantine. Difficult questions quickly spring to mind: For instance,
investigations into seemingly minor offenses sometimes escalate gradually into investigations into more serious matters;
at what point in the evolution of an affair of this sort would
the police be obliged to give Miranda warnings to a suspect
in custody? What evidence would be necessary to establish
that an arrest for a misdemeanor offense was merely a pretext to enable the police to interrogate the suspect (in hopes
of obtaining information about a felony) without providing
the safeguards prescribed by Miranda? The litigation necessary to resolve such matters would be time-consuming and
disruptive of law enforcement. And the end result would be
an elaborate set of rules, interlaced with exceptions and subtle distinctions, discriminating between different kinds of
custodial interrogations. Neither the police nor criminal defendants would benefit from such a development.441
The language is certainly reminiscent of the language of anti-intellectualism. It sounds pro-police in that it sympathizes with difficulties in decision-making. It seems that Justice Marshall’s reasoning
revealed that to side with the pro-police rule would essentially vitiate
Miranda in situations in which it clearly would apply.
The best citizens could do in Berkemer was to limp out with a ruling that Miranda applies in some traffic stops, but not all, and that it
441. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 430–32 (emphasis added) (citations and footnote call numbers omitted).
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applies for all arrests, regardless of the purpose of the arrest. The
opinion is not anti-intellectual in the sense that it prevents the sort of
sweeping up that police may practice under Atwater, Moore, Belton, and
other Fourth Amendment cases: Pull a motorist over, arrest him for
the minor traffic offense (an offense either real or imagined, as in
Devenpeck—or police could just lie and say that an offense was committed), search the passenger compartment of his car and the containers
in the compartment, and even impound the car and search the trunk
as well. Under the sheriff’s proposed rule, police would have been
able to pull over a citizen and interrogate him or even arrest him for a
minor offense and interrogate him, and, in some instances, get incriminating information about other crimes from the citizen before it
became clear, in the eyes of the Court, that the Miranda warnings were
required. Perhaps the Court found this to be too offensive or too
totalitarian of an option.
V. WHAT’S SO BAD ABOUT ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE?
A.

IN

AMERICAN

Abandonment of Rule of Law and Reason-Giving

Anti-intellectualism of the sort this Article has identified is incommensurate with the rule of law. Courts are designed primarily to resolve individual disputes of fact and law rather than to create broad
policies. In short, they are designed to think about whether constitutional rights have been violated in individual situations. In many of
the cases discussed above, the Court rejected such thinking by claiming—erroneously and tendentiously—that thinking would be too difficult for the police or for judges. Although one might argue that the
Supreme Court is not merely a court but also a policymaking body,
the Court in these cases creates rules that prevent the resolution of
individual complaints. So, the Court’s anti-intellectualism is made
into law that will be followed in lower courts.
This anti-intellectualism arises from a fear that not to give police
the power to rely on hunches, or even dumb luck as in Belton and
Atwater, will result in slippage in the War on Crime: Evidence will be
lost and crooks will escape. Therefore, giving police the power to decide whether to search passenger compartments of vehicles or to arrest someone who has committed only a minor traffic offense allows
the police to rely on, at best, hunches, or worse, racism and other
biases.442 There is no reason to seize the Ms. Atwaters of the world.
442. See infra Part V.C.
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There is no reason to search the passenger compartments of the Mr.
Beltons of the world. But by dismissing, with the rhetoric of anti-intellectualism, the argument that any police search or seizure should be
supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause, the Court has
extinguished thinking itself. Allowing government actors to use extraordinary powers against citizens—rummaging through their belongings, handcuffing them, and locking them in jails—should be
based on reason. Instead, police are given the power to be arbitrary
and capricious—the very opposite of law. Impliedly, the Court seems
to be admitting a belief that the War on Crime cannot be won by legal
means, but only by government actors who violate the law.
The dangers of giving police broad discretion to pick and choose
whom they will search or seize have been a focus of criminal procedure scholars for decades. These scholars have pointed out that this
discretion is dangerous to an ordered democracy and perpetuates racism and other prejudices against racial and political minorities.443
The first danger—the danger to democracy—is well known and will
be merely mentioned: Allowing what are essentially suspicionless
searches violates the thrust of the Fourth Amendment and is a gateway
to tyranny, petty and otherwise.444 The second danger is that allowing
police discretion and even lawlessness does not promote a healthy relationship between citizens and their government. As Elizabeth Joh
has observed, “Researchers in the field of procedural justice have repeatedly pointed out the correlation between personal experiences
and general attitudes towards the law.”445 A person who is treated
fairly—regardless of the outcome—will be more likely to respect and
443. Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CAL.
L. REV. 199, 201–02, 208–11 (2007) (surveying scholarship).
444. Justice Jackson famously wrote the following:
These . . . are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a
population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart.
Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in
the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to have
dwelt and worked among a people possessed of many admirable qualities but
deprived of these rights to know that the human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject
at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180–81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). In a wellknown article, Anthony Amsterdam observed, “[The Fourth Amendment opposes]
searches and seizures . . . conducted at the discretion of executive officials, who may act
despotically and capriciously in the exercise of the power to search and seize. This . . .
concern runs against arbitrary searches and seizures: it condemns the petty tyranny of unregulated rummagers.” Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 411 (1974).
445. Joh, supra note 443, at 232.
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comply voluntarily with the law, and vice versa.446 One elemental
problem is that the Court’s allowing police to use their discretion
without giving any explanation discounts an important part of the relationship between government and the governed in a democracy—
reason-giving. As Robert Bone points out, many legal scholars have
argued that the government “has a moral obligation to give reasons
when it imposes substantial burdens on individuals.”447 This moral
obligation has been viewed as grounded in the values of respect and
dignity as well as in the value of preventing arbitrary government action.448 But in the cases discussed above, no reason-giving is ever necessary: Police are simply empowered to search or seize if they wish to
do so. Indeed, in Devenpeck, Justice Scalia wrote that the police need
not give a citizen any reason why they are arresting him—surely a
“substantial burden on [the] individual[ ]”449—since the citizen can
learn the reason at some point in the subsequent forty-eight hours
from a prosecutor or judge.450 Requiring the police to give a reason
at the time of arrest would not only help avoid arrests based on mistakes (which is discussed below), but it would also avoid stripping of
the individual’s dignity, a value that has been recognized by criminal
procedure scholars.451
Technically, the government is supposed to serve its citizens and
not the other way around; we are not its servants who may be removed
from the streets at will and without explanation. But an even deeper
lack of respect lurks. Even if an arrestee is actually told the crime for
446. Id. at 232–33.
447. Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 873, 903–04 (2009) (citing sources). Bone discusses the need for reason-giving not
in the context of criminal procedure but in civil procedure—particularly, complaints in
civil lawsuits—and concludes that “the fairness argument based on reason-giving has force
in the pleading context.” Id. at 907.
448. Id. at 903–04 (citing, inter alia, LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
663–64, 666 (2d ed. 1988) (1978)). Bone points out that not all government action requires explicit reason-giving: A judge’s evidentiary rulings, a jury’s verdict, and a judge’s
sentencing a criminal are examples of where reason-giving may be avoided. Id. at 904
(citing Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 634, 637 (1995)). Bone
notes, however, that the reasons can be inferred through the arguments made, so the
aggrieved person is not left entirely in the dark. Id. at 904. Furthermore, the reasons can
be given on appeal. In the searches and seizures discussed in this Article, however, no
reason need ever be given for why the police decided to search or seize the particular suspect, even when a casual observer would recognize (or at least suspect) that the arrest
violated the norm (if not the Constitutional mandate) of equal protection of law.
449. Id. at 903.
450. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 155 & n.3 (2004) (citing County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 53 (1991)).
451. See, e.g., Sundby, supra note 128, at 1783 (explaining the importance of a government recognizing the human dignity of its citizens).
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which he is being arrested—which, after all, is what was at issue in
Devenpeck—the Court has essentially said that the police need never tell
him why he was arrested for the particular violation when practically
no other citizen who committed the violation was ever arrested for
it.452
A citizen who is arrested for a violation for which others are not
arrested will likely harbor deep suspicions against the arresting officer. Observers and those who later hear about the arrest may also
end up harboring such suspicion. Indeed, in Atwater, there is a sense
that the officer singled out Gail Atwater to abuse her. The Court
noted that Officer Turek had stopped Ms. Atwater at some earlier
point under the mistaken accusation that she was violating the
seatbelt rule.453 But even this sense was not enough for the Court to
rule in that case that the arrest was unconstitutional. Although this
argument is veering into the area of motive, as opposed to intent, it
nevertheless is important for a person to know the officer’s reason—
or motive—for arresting him for a crime that no one else is arrested
for, even if to do so in some cases is difficult, as Margaret Raymond
has argued.454 At issue is a substantial intrusion by the government
and the reasons for that intrusion.455 The officer’s subjective intent
452. See Maclin, supra note 11, at 113 (discussing a study showing that on one section of
the New Jersey Turnpike, ninety-eight percent of the drivers were committing traffic
offenses).
453. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 324 n.1 (2001).
454. See Margaret Raymond, On Rights and Responsibilities: A Response to The Problem of
Pretext, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 369, 373 (2007). George Dix argues forcefully that
subjective and not merely objective inquiry into a police officer’s state of mind be carried
out as part of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. See Dix, supra note 351, at 478. Dix
argues that there is “absolutely nothing” to support the view that inquiring into a police
officer’s mental state would be difficult, impractical, or produce inaccuracies. Id. Dix also
notes that the justice system mandates “substantive culpable mental state requirements for
conviction of offenders” and that there is no suggestion that “law enforcement officers are
more inscrutable” than these offenders. Id. Nor would this inquiry be too onerous. According to Dix, Oregon courts consider the officer’s objective and subjective state of mind
in the probable cause determination under that state’s constitution, and it has not proved
impossible or too costly. Id. at 473.
455. Motive is not so difficult to determine: Lawyers often offer evidence of motive.
Raymond correctly states that “[m]otive, unlike intent, is something into which the criminal law inquires only rarely, and for good reason.” Raymond, supra note 454, at 373. Although Raymond does not explain why this is good, it is assumed she means that it would
be difficult to inquire into motive. That said, evidence of motive is often proved in criminal cases, even if not actually required. See, e.g., People v. Estep, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859,
862–63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (characterizing motive as “merely one circumstance in the
proof puzzle” and finding no error in the trial court’s jury instruction that “‘[m]otive is not
an element of the crime charged and need not be shown’”); State v. Elwell, 209 P. 616, 617
(Or. 1922) (“Evidence of motive is relevant in criminal prosecutions to identify the accused as the one who committed the crime, and not to show that the crime has been
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may, at times, involve racial or personal animus. The Court’s antiintellectual position in the cases discussed above prevents any discussion about the danger of police singling out individuals for untoward
or even downright unconstitutional reasons. The important point to
this argument is that the Court just as easily could allow such discussion if it did not let anti-intellectualism inform its decisions.
The Court’s encouragement of lawlessness in these situations appears to be saying that we have a system of law, just not on the streets.
The Court succumbs to excessive fear and sedulously avoids intellectual inquiry that could threaten its broad grant of power to police.
B. Inaccuracy and Effect on Public Safety
If arguments based on respect for individuals seem too precious
to some people in what some might characterize as a scared, post-9/
11 era, then there are some realities that are not so precious. One
such reality is that police hunches are likely to be inaccurate. As The
Honorable Harold Baer, Jr., a federal district court judge from the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, has
argued, “[W]hile hunches may be useful in other limited settings, they
raise cause for concern in the dynamic and dangerous field of law
enforcement, where the liberty we value so highly is an ingredient to
be considered in most police activity.”456 Judge Baer defined hunches
as “intuitive judgments that rise to our consciousness without explanation.”457 They come from our “‘adaptive unconscious,’” a part of the
brain, and “derive from an individual’s pattern recognition, memories, and experience.”458 Judge Baer further explains that “[s]ince
hunches are heuristic, rather than analytical, in nature, they are based
on all of our experiences”459 and “may be biased by experiences and
personal morals, which inevitably affect their accuracy.”460 Moreover,
as Judge Baer observed, police are more likely to interpret normal
committed.”). Presumably, to pursue a Fourth Amendment claim based on improper motive (if it were allowed) would be at the § 1983 plaintiff’s, or criminal defendant’s, behest,
and the aggrieved party would have the burden of production and proof. Motive could be
proved in the usual way—by evidence and inference.
456. The Honorable Harold Baer, Jr., Got a Bad Feeling? Is That Enough? The Irrationality
of Police Hunches, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 91, 92 (2007). Judge Baer is well known for provoking the wrath of “Law and Order Conservatives” in the 1990s when he granted a motion to
suppress under the Fourth Amendment for lack of probable cause; Members of Congress
circulated an impeachment petition. See id. at 92–93.
457. Id. at 98 (citing Gerd Gigerenzer & Henry Brighton, Can Hunches Be Rational?, 4
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 155, 156 (2007)).
458. Id.
459. Id. (footnote call number omitted).
460. Id.
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events as criminal because they see so much criminal activity; this results from the “‘availability heuristic.’ ”461 “Unlike the ordinary citizen, police officers face hostile and frightening situations daily and
consequently fall easy victim to unconscious feelings of bias,
prejudice, and the availability heuristic. Police officers, then, are
likely to come to work with more ‘baggage’ than the private
citizen.”462
Indeed, it is unlikely that police hunches—even if we were to believe that they could be exercised without improper bias—will ever be
systematically reliable. Although some readers might think that seasoned and hardened police can hone their hunches like the experts
Malcolm Gladwell discusses in Blink,463 those readers would almost
certainly be incorrect.464 This sort of expertise requires immediate
feedback as well as judicious analysis. Here, the police are not getting
feedback about all of the criminals they are missing, all of the middleclass Caucasians they are not stopping who do have drugs or who are
otherwise involved in criminal activity. Instead, police often simply
are learning from veteran police officers who have spent their careers
focusing on minority neighborhoods.465 We do not know how many
minorities the police are stopping and searching—in all the ways allowed by the cases discussed above—without finding drugs. Thanks to
the Supreme Court, the people who are needlessly and fruitlessly
searched or arrested have no way of complaining, at least under the
United States Constitution. There exists no official data pool. Police
themselves do not appear to keep these sorts of statistics.466 The sort
of feedback required for the development of the kind of expertise
461. See id. at 98–102.
462. Id. at 100.
463. MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (2005).
464. See Baer, supra note 456, at 98–100 (discussing one of Gladwell’s examples, a counterfeit Greek kouros statue that the Getty Museum bought, believing it to be more than two
thousand years old, and stating that “[the art expert] could afford to offer a hunch with
relatively benign consequences,” while “[i]n the dangerous reality of law enforcement,
hunches may result in different and far more serious consequences, both for the citizen
and for the police officer”).
465. See id. at 100–02, 104–05 (discussing Andrew J. McClurg, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using
Cognitive Dissonance Theory to Reduce Police Lying, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389 (1999)). McClurg suggests not pairing veterans with rookies, as a way of breaking the chain by which
police pass down ideas such as loyalty to one another at all costs, including protecting
fellow officers involved in corruption. See McClurg, supra, at 442–43.
466. Even if police kept such statistics, citizens might not be able to obtain them. Elizabeth Joh observed the following:
Unlike these other actors [in the Executive Branch], however, discretion in law
enforcement is usually exercised covertly and with minimal oversight. Most citizens lack the equivalent of a sunshine law to review the decisions made by officers
in their local police departments. In contrast, a number of federal, state, and
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that can work in a blink is not available. We have no way of testing
police claims about their own expertise. An obvious danger of police
inaccuracy means that when they are spending their time stopping,
searching, and even jailing people who are not criminals, they are taking time away from the patrols and investigations that could lead them
to real criminals, with an attendant, salutary effect on public safety.
Another danger is that police waste citizens’ time, making it less likely
that these citizens will cooperate with police when the police conduct
real investigations.467
C. Perpetuation (Unwitting or Not) of Racial and Cultural Stereotypes
Another problem is that permitting police to act on hunches perpetuates racial and cultural stereotypes, especially throughout the
criminal justice system where these stereotypes can do the most harm.
Police come to the job—as we all do—with various biases. Some of
these biases are racist;468 others are political or cultural.469 It is known
that one way to limit racial and cultural bias is through education,
formal and otherwise.470 Alas, as Judge Baer notes, “The presence of
the availability heuristic makes it even harder [to educate police beyond such biases].”471
But police are the tip of the spear of the Executive Branch. They
are the ones who choose whether to have intrusive encounters with
local statutes, such as the Freedom of Information Act, exist to provide this information regarding other executive decisions.
Joh, supra note 443, at 206 (footnote call numbers omitted).
467. Both of these dangers are discussed more in-depth in a related context. See Foley,
supra note 193, at 1042–55. These dangers are accentuated in a mass roundup of terrorist
suspects who are mostly innocent and not identified accurately because of the lack of rules
and procedures set up to identify actual terrorists. See id. The idea is the same, however, in
that the roundup of prisoners who ended up at Guantanamo and other United States antiterror prisons was based on such inaccurate information that it was similar to police acting
on hunches and biases. See DAVID A. HARRIS, GOOD COPS: THE CASE FOR PREVENTIVE POLICING (2005) (comparing good police practices studied among several departments and contrasting positive “preventive policing,” which seeks to protect, inter alia, constitutional
rights, with post-9/11 “Ashcroft policing”).
468. E.g., Baer, supra note 456, at 100 (discussing findings of the Christopher Commission, which reviewed Los Angeles Police Department conduct: “[T]he Commission found a
pervasive racial and ethnic bias, which the police officers brought to the force, and which
colored their actions, and by definition their hunches” (footnote call number omitted)).
469. Maclin, supra note 11, at 111 & n.125 (discussing a 1969 study, cited in a brief in
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), in which fifteen college students with good driving
records were suddenly stopped numerous times after putting Black Panther bumper stickers on their cars, and discussing news accounts of police stopping drivers for ACLU and
NRA bumper stickers and even stopping males for wearing long hair).
470. See Baer, supra note 456, at 100.
471. Id.
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citizens—encounters that have a much greater and more immediate
effect on the citizen than, say, contact from a clerk in the Registry of
Deeds. The police officer’s hunch might be based on a racial stereotype—for example, a stereotype that young black males are more
likely to possess drugs than are other people.472 So, even if prosecutors eventually are educated such that they suffer less from racial biases, prosecutors (and judges) encounter a steady stream of racial
minorities presumptively branded as criminals. The availability heuristic can cause bias to pervade the entire system: The prosecutor who
mostly sees African-American criminals might, over time, acquire
some of this bias himself. The same goes for judges, who are, after all,
only human. In this way, racial stereotypes can proliferate.
This is to say nothing of deliberate racism, often called “pretext,”
about which much has been written.473 It is hard to prove deliberate
racism.474 This unconscious racism, however, may be a deeper
threat.475 It is harder to detect, certainly, even by its purveyors, who
may believe they are acting “normally.” And when police do not have
to give reasons for discretionary searches or seizures, conscious and
unconscious racism may prevail.
The well-known facts suggest that this is precisely what is going
on. Numerous studies have shown that police focus on minorities in
street encounters and traffic stops.476 Prison statistics reveal that minorities make up the majority of the United States prison population.477 There is also evidence that police target specific
472. It might also be based on the availability heuristic. See supra text accompanying
notes 459–62.
473. See, e.g., TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 476–79. See generally DAVID A. HARRIS,
PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK (2002). Studies have shown
that policing by using racial profiling is less effective in detecting “drugs, guns, and bad
guys” than policing that does not employ racial profiling. David A. Harris, Racial Profiling
Revisited: “Just Common Sense” in the Fight Against Terror?, 17 CRIM. JUST. 36 (2002). For an
argument that much police profiling is actually unconscious and that the profiling debate
should take cognitive models of behavior into account, see Alex Geisinger, Rethinking Profiling: A Cognitive Model of Bias and Its Legal Implications, 86 OR. L. REV. 657 (2007).
474. Maclin, supra note 11, at 116–18 (discussing the difficulty of establishing equal protection claims for pretextual stops).
475. Not to mention the more extensive unconscious racism that pervades our culture.
See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 318–27, 330–44 (1987).
476. See, e.g., Baer, supra note 456, at 100–01 (citing studies and reports about Los Angeles and New York City); Maclin, supra note 11, at 93–94 (discussing numerous studies confirming that police engage in racial profiling).
477. See PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS
IN 2005 8 (2006), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p05.pdf. In 2005, AfricanAmericans made up forty percent of the Nation’s total prison population, Hispanics made
up twenty percent, and Caucasians made up thirty-five percent. Id. By contrast, according
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neighborhoods, believing those neighborhoods to be the locus of
crime. A study conducted by prison inmates in New York showed that
seventy-five percent of all prisoners in New York come from just seven
blighted neighborhoods in New York City.478 In this way, police believe the criminals are in these neighborhoods—or in particular cars
or wearing certain sweatshirts or sneakers—and look there for crime.
And they often find it, usually in the form of drug possession. One
wonders, however, if police would find similar law-breaking if they focused on affluent Caucasian neighborhoods. They would find cocaine, marijuana, prescription drugs—the whole apothecary. But
these affluent whites just do not look like criminals to many people in
our society,479 especially to the police, who are likely to be uncritical
products of our society’s mores, stereotypes, and biases. Given that
intellectuals are known—and sometimes despised—for questioning
social mores, shibboleths, and stereotypes, it would seem that a
healthy dose of intellectualism would prevent the cancer of racism
from pervading our criminal justice system. The Supreme Court
should think about these concerns that the Justices brush aside as the
poppycock and drivel of effeminate intellectuals.480 Our law requires
more intellectualism, not less.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have seen that the Supreme Court’s reasoning has been antiintellectual at times when some Justices appear to have felt the need
to protect what they see as effective law enforcement. The Court has
accepted the idea that police officers should, in some instances, be
free to follow their instinct—be free to not articulate reasons for
searching and seizing—notwithstanding the constitutional limits of
probable cause and reasonable suspicion. Police have been given this
to United States Census Bureau estimates for 2008, Black persons make up nearly thirteen
percent of the overall Nation’s population, persons of Hispanic or Latino origin make up
just over fifteen percent, and White persons not Hispanic make up just over sixty-five percent. United States Census Bureau, USA QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/00000.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2010).
478. See Frances X. Clines, Ex-Inmates Urge Return to Areas of Crime to Help, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 1992, at A1 (describing a study, conducted by prisoners at a “think tank” at New
York’s Green Haven Prison, as “accepted research”).
479. Baer, supra note 456, at 98–99 (discussing Implicit Association Tests that detect
unconscious racism).
480. The equation of intellectualism with effeminacy—as Hofstadter points out is often
the case, see HOFSTADTER, supra note 7, at 18–19—is a further barrier to encouraging intellectualism among police. See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 3, at 480 (discussing police culture
in which “[s]ome police exhibit distrust and suspicion of civilians, ‘macho’ attitudes, a
tendency toward conservatism, and a desire for tidiness and order”).
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discretion as a result of the judicial reasoning that any rule guiding
police and requiring meaningful thought and inquiry would be too
difficult or too unwieldy for police and judges to follow.
This anti-intellectual rhetoric and reasoning is actually antagonistic to civil liberties in ways that, until now, have gone unnoticed. It is
not the thinking about the rights, but the rights themselves, that the
Court sees as getting in the way of the government’s War on Crime.
We have seen that police are required to think rigorously when doing
so would protect a most basic civil liberty—the right to not be killed
by the government without good reason. That the Court in Tennessee
v. Garner481 sees police as able to think about the danger a fleeing
suspect poses482—an inherently split-second decision—belies the conclusion in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista483 that police officers are unable
to make this same determination when faced with the supposedly
split-second decision of whether to arrest a motorist who has committed a minor traffic offense.484 Indeed, if the officer needs more time
to decide whether to arrest the suspected traffic misdemeanant, he
can take that time. There is no pressing danger; no one is fleeing.
This is not to say that there may not, at times, be dangers that
police can sense—crimes that police officers could disrupt but for
constitutional requirements of restraint. Legal standards that force
police to articulate their reasons for infringing on rights will, at times,
get in the way of policing that relies on hunches and dumb luck. Indeed, as Hofstadter observed, “In a certain sense . . . intellect is dangerous. Left free, there is nothing it will not reconsider, analyze,
throw into question.”485 Government antipathy toward intellectuals
and intellect is, therefore, natural to a certain extent. But Hofstadter
also reminds us that it is more dangerous for a government to ignore
intellectuals and to banish thought and reflection from public discourse.486 Similarly, a government that opposes civil liberties and
paints them as unnecessary and even as subversive is, in the long run,
481. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
482. See supra Part IV.A.
483. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
484. See supra Part III.D.
485. HOFSTADTER, supra note 7, at 45. Hofstadter further explained the following:
“Let us admit the case of the conservative,” John Dewey once wrote. “If we once
start thinking no one can guarantee what will be the outcome, except that many
objects, ends and institutions will be surely doomed. Every thinker puts some portion of an apparently stable world in peril, and no one can wholly predict what
will emerge in its place.”
Id. (footnote call number omitted).
486. Id. (“[T]he only assurance that can be given to any community is that it will be far
worse off if it denies the free uses of the power of intellect than if it permits them.”).
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a law-breaking government—a government that is more dangerous to
ordered liberty than a government that respects citizens’ rights and
accepts that it cannot prevent and punish all crime.
Anti-intellectualism in criminal procedure must be faced and
challenged on these terms, lest it continue to take us down the road
toward an oppressive, prejudicial society where arbitrary police behavior is the rule, a society where there are no citizens—just criminals we
have not yet caught.

